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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The cycle of poor credit history is a powerful one.  An individual or 
business with a low credit rating, perhaps from the late payment of past 
bills, will have difficulty gaining access to traditional forms of lending.  
According to some sources, many banks within the United States may 
even collect data about the financial histories of individuals with respect 
to their bank accounts and use that information to prohibit individuals 
with a poor record from opening or maintaining a checking account.1  
Yet, it is the status of maintaining a traditional bank account that 
provides creditors with the assurance that an individual or business is 
credit worthy.2  Without access to credit, those with a poor or non-
existent credit history will not have the opportunity to improve their 
ratings.  Thus, the cycle continues: those with bad credit are unable to 
gain access to loans or to make improvements to their businesses.3  They 
 
*  Robert W. Emerson,  B.A., Sewanee: Univ. of the South; J.D., Harvard Law School.  Huber 
Hurst Professor of Business Law, Univ. of Florida. 
 1. James Marvin Perez, Blacklisted: The Unwarranted Divestment of Access to Bank 
Accounts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1586, 1587–96 (2005). 
 2.  Id. at 1587. 
 3.  There is a funding crisis for some businesses, which certainly extends to franchising.  
Analysis from early 2011 finds only 31% of business owners with assets, such as cash, sufficient to 
meet the collateral requirements of banks and Small Business Administration (SBA) lenders.  See 
“Collateral Crisis” Creates Unprecedented Divide Among Small Business Owners: MultiFunding’s 
National Small Business Lending Snapshot Results, MULTIFUNDING (May 5, 2011), http:/
/multifunding.com/uncategorized/small-businesses-divided-by-lenders-the-haves-and-the-have-
nots/. 
These are the “asset rich” business owners who are most likely to benefit from low interest rates via 
a commercial mortgage or a loan program backed by the SBA.  Id.  Twice as many business owners 
are either “marginal (B grade) business owners” (47%) or “non-lendable (C grade) business 
owners” (15%), who all lack the assets backing their business and needed for the standard lending 
arrangements.  Id.  The “B Borrowers” who are “marginal” have adequate credit and cash flow, but 
must turn to Factoring, Merchant Cash Advance Loans, Unsecured Loans or Private Money Loans; 
to get financing, they must pay a high premium because of their lack of collateral.  Id.  As for the 
non-lendable group, their bad credit and poor cash flow, along with having no collateral, means 
even the fringe lending would be extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain.  Id.  Therefore, a 
national lending crisis faces more than 30 million small businesses; this is particularly problematic 
for the smaller “small” businesses, which have under $1 million in income.  Id.  The C borrowers’ 
only option would be microlenders, with loans capped at $35,000 to $50,000.  See Dawn Rivers, 
This Month, a New Financing Crisis for Small Businesses, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS (June 3, 
2011), http://smallbiztrends.com/2011/06/new-financing-crisis-small-businesses.html; Rebecca 
Mowbray, A New Crop of Microlenders Can Help Businesses When Larger Banks Can’t, THE 
2
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are stuck in the fringe economy: a banking world where consumers and 
small businesses alike suffer from questionable practices and, at least for 
the consumers, inadequate regulation. 
This Article considers fringe banking issues—the gaps or problems 
in service for both individuals and businesses when the usual banking 
channels are impractical or even unavailable.  Some people may only 
have recourse to the robust, but often very expensive and less protected, 
financial products sold for what is, or is supposed to be, a very short-
term basis.  The Article first examines the fringe banking world, but 
ultimately considers whether and how consumer protections are needed 
for franchisees.  Small businesses, including franchisees, are often the 
forgotten players in the fringe economy.  If a franchise actually engages 
in selling fringe banking products, it almost certainly got to that position 
by not engaging in the financial practices it now trumpets and sells to 
others.  If a franchisee buys fringe banking products, whether and how 
this small businessperson deserves the regulatory protections of a person 
not engaged in business is a matter not just for statutory or 
administrative law but also requires consideration of the franchise 
relationship and its likely impact on franchisee finances. 
II. FILLING THE FINANCIAL SERVICES GAP: THE RISE AND REGULATION 
OF FRINGE BANKING 
A. The Dramatic Growth of Fringe Services 
In the past two decades, fringe banking services have grown from 
near nonexistence into a $100 billion business,4 with more check-
cashing and payday lending locations in the United States than 
McDonald’s, Burger King, Target, Sears, JCPenney, and Wal-Mart 
locations combined.5  Indeed, there are many nontraditional fringe 
 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, (July 31, 2011, 8:00 AM) http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/
2011/07/a_new_crop_of_microlenders_can.html (noting that after the 2008 financial crisis, the 
tightening of lending requirements has created an opening for microlenders to furnish financing to 
small businesses, including franchisees; microlenders tout default rates that they claim are lower 
than for-business-loans through traditional lending institutions). 
 4.  Joe Mahon, Tracking “Fringe Banking,” FEDGAZETTE (Sept. 1, 2008), 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4030 (noting a report of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). 
 5.  Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking 
and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2011) (citing HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: 
LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 6 (2005)).  Total fringe-banking outlets, though, evidently 
have started to shrink.  For example, the number of payday loan stores fell from 24,200 in 2006 to 
19,700 in 2010.  Maya Jackson Randall & Alan Zibel, A Payday Loan in Disguise? Consumer 
3
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lending locations.6  For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) reports that about eighteen percent of all U.S. 
households have relied on pawn shops, payday lenders, or check-cashing 
outlets at least once throughout the past five years.7  While many of 
these customers do in fact possess bank accounts, they responded to an 
FDIC survey that they plan to continue using these fringe services due to 
their convenience and the ease of acquiring loans.8  In addition, one 
report states that the typical user for payday loans is actually the head of 
a family unit with checking accounts and steady employment, but with 
blemished credit.9 
Financial institutions subject to federal regulation, such as banks 
and credit unions, have been the traditional resource for consumers and 
businesses seeking to procure loans and to cash checks.  However, with 
nearly seventeen million Americans, or 7.7% of all households, without 
any sort of checking or savings account,10 there has been an increasing 
 
Advocates, Banks Spar over ‘Direct-Deposit Advances’; the Yates Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 
2011, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB20001424053111904006104576502793158420916.html (reporting the estimates of investment 
banking-firm Stephens Inc.). 
 6.  Jacob Goldstein, Wal-Mart Goes Big In Fringe Banking, NPR (Mar. 17, 2010, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/03/walmart_goes_big_in_fringe_ban.html (noting that Wal-
Mart  had “MoneyCenters” in a thousand of its U.S. stores and planned to add 400 more by the end 
of 2010, bringing the total to 40% of the Wal-Marts in America; the centers offer such fringe-
banking services as check cashing); Andrew Martin & Stephanie Clifford, High Bank Fees Give 
Wal-Mart a Money Aisle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/wal-mart-benefits-from-anger-over-banking-
fees.html?pagewanted=all (noting that over 1,000 U.S. Wal-Mart stores permit customers to cash 
work and government checks, pay bills, wire money overseas, and load money on to a prepaid debit 
card). 
 7.  David Ellis, 17 Million Americans Have No Bank Account, CNN MONEY (Dec. 2, 2009, 
6:11 PM EST), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/02/news/economy/fdic_survey/.  Fringe lending 
practices are also prominent in other nations, such as Australia.  Infosys Technologies Ltd., Fringe 
Lending in Australia – An Overview, INFOSYS TECH. LTD. (Feb. 2008), http://www.nab.com.au/
vgnmedia/downld/Infosys_Fringe_Lending_Study_PDF.pdf. 
 8.  Ellis, supra note 7. 
 9.  Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that 
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 8–15 (2003). 
 10.  Ellis, supra note 7.  This percentage of the “unbanked” has increased since 2009, up 
821,000 more U.S. households—a 0.6 percentage point increase bringing the percentage to well 
over eight percent.  Halah Touryalai, Who Needs Banks?  Number of Americans Without Bank 
Accounts Rises, FORBES, Sept. 17, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/20
12/09/17/who-needs-banks-number-of-americans-without-bank-accounts-rises/ (further noting that 
28.3% of all U.S. households conduct some or all of their financial transactions outside of the 
mainstream banking system, with over two-thirds of these households being “underbanked”—with a 
checking or savings account but also using payday loans, rent-to-own arrangements, pawn shops, 
refund anticipation loans, and/or non-bank money orders, check cashing, or remittances).  
4
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need to provide financial services through alternative means.  It appears 
that even those with bank accounts may have financial needs that 
standard banks cannot or will not meet, such as advanced payments to 
cover emergency expenses or small loans that are too hard to acquire.11  
For individuals with poor credit records, access to credit may be as 
limited as for those that are without bank accounts entirely.12 
Fringe banking organizations, a term used to characterize any 
financial service provider offering products outside of the standard 
banking industry,13 have become the main financial resource for the 
“unbanked” and individuals lacking suitable credit.  Fringe banking 
outlets include check-cashing businesses,14 payday lenders,15 and pawn 
shops.16 
Indeed, for many small businesses, such as franchisees, pawn shops 
have become a prominent source of funds, albeit usually just a short-
 
 11.  Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services 
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of 
Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 606-08 (2000). 
 12.  John P. Caskey, Explaining the Boom in Check-Cashing Outlets and Pawnshops, 49 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 5 (1995). 
 13.  Indeed, fringe banking encompasses any non-traditional lending source.  See generally 
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 629 (discussing the fringe banking system and its impact on 
minority communities). 
 14.  Check-cashing outlets provide cash advance loans, in which an individual or business 
writes the provider a check for a specified loan amount plus a fee.  Betts v. McKenzie Check 
Advance of Fla., 879 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  The lender will keep the fee and 
give the individual the value of the loan in cash, but will not cash the individual’s check until a later 
date.  Id. at 669.  Prior to the expiration of the loan, the consumer can receive his check from the 
lender by providing the lender the same value in cash.  Id.  If the individual cannot provide the cash 
value to the lender, the loan can be rolled over with an extended expiration date and the consumer 
paying an additional fee.  Id.  This rollover process may continue several times, with fees incurred 
at each occurrence, or the individual may default and pay the fee for insufficient funds when the 
lender attempts to cash the check.  Id. 
 15.  Payday lenders offer similar loans to check-cashing businesses, but the check written to 
the fringe provider is postdated to the date of the individual’s next paycheck.  Jim Hawkins & 
Ronald J. Mann, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857 (2007).  The lender then gives the 
individual cash immediately, holds onto the check, and retains the fee from the individual.  Id. at 
857.  On the date of the check, which should coincide with the individual’s receipt of his next 
paycheck, the lender deposits the check as repayment for the loan.  Id.  These loans are typically for 
small dollar amounts, such as $500 or less, but the fees associated with the advance typically exceed 
an APR of over 400%.  WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: 
BANKRUPTCY, SECURITY INTERESTS, COLLECTION 1:20 (rev. ed. 2011). 
 16.  Ellis, supra note 7.  Pawn shops also provide small loans to individuals and businesses, 
with the collateral for the loan being not a postdated check, but an item of value; see also Caskey, 
supra note 12, at 4.  The debtor leaves that item with the pawn shop, which provides cash to the 
debtor in an amount less than the value of the collateral.  Id.  Most loans mature after one month; 
however, similar to check-cashing outlets, pawn shops give debtors the option of rolling over the 
loan, something typically available indefinitely, with fees, of course, incurred each time.  Id. 
5
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term solution to “help a struggling business stay afloat a little while 
longer, which may be all the business needs to recover.”17  Also, various 
lenders provide credit in the form of auto title loans,18 comparable 
property loans,19 and refund anticipation loans.20 
 
 17.  Cynthia Hsu, Small Business Owners Turn to Pawn Shops, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2011, 
4:51 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/10/tagblogsfindlawcom2011-
freeenterprise-idUS334756794120110810; see also Katherine Scarrow, Need a Small Business 
Loan? Try the Pawn Shop, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada) (Aug. 11, 2011, 10:42 AM EDT), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/small-business-briefing/need-
a-small-business-loan-try-the-pawn-shop/article2126295/. 
Alternatively, the argument is that a small, struggling business, being forced to resort to fringe 
banking and the high interest rates implicit in fringe banking may only perpetuate or contribute to 
additional economic troubles, if not collapse.  Id. 
 18.  While auto title loans are analogous to check-cashing and payday loans, the collateral that 
the creditor holds is an individual’s automobile title.  Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. 
ON REG. 121, 164 (2004).  These loans are typically within the range of $250 to $1,000 and have a 
one-month term of repayment.  Id. at 164.  If the borrower does not repay the loan and the interest 
accrued, the lender repossesses the automobile and may retain the proceeds from the sale of the 
automobile, even when the value exceeds the amount of the loan.  Id. at 164-65.  Title lending is 
arguably an especially egregious service, as the borrower gives her vehicle as collateral for a cash 
loan.  Id. at 166.  If the borrower is unable to repay the loan, her mode of transportation is lost, 
which may be her sole method of getting to work or getting her children to school.  Id. 
One report indicated that 9.18% of new-title vehicles were repossessed in Tennessee in 2008 for 
failure to repay a loan amount.  Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-
Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 565 (2012).  As such, borrowers take on a huge risk in 
choosing to get a loan, even if the numbers have sometimes been overstated.  Id. at 560-61, 565 
(concluding that confusing reports from Tennessee led to the erroneous conclusion in a 2007 law 
review article, Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Economic Predators or a New Financing Services 
Model?, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007), that 35% to 50% of auto-title loans resulted in 
repossessions while the actual rate of repossession was three to seven times smaller and reporting 
figures from six states—Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia—indicating that 
“repossession rates for those states are much lower than previous research has indicated”). 
 19.  Some lenders provide a service similar to auto title loans, involving collateral other than 
motor vehicles; they instead use household appliances as the collateral.  Barr, supra note 18, at 164. 
 20.  Refund anticipation loans (RALs) may be less prominent than other fringe lending 
services such as auto title or payday or check-cashing loans, in part because these tend to be 
seasonal, typically existing in the early part of the year when persons are completing their tax forms 
and awaiting a refund.  These loans, though, have been very popular.  Kathryn Smetana, Refund 
Anticipation Loans: Less Money for Consumers Entitled to Refunds, More Profit for H&R Block, 14 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 371, 371 (2002) (noting that an estimated eleven million taxpayers utilize 
these loans and spend more than $800 million each year to obtain them).  They provide borrowers 
with a guarantee of receipt of their tax refund checks more quickly than the standard receipt by the 
IRS.  Id. at 371 (refund checks are delivered typically in two days as opposed to ten to fourteen days 
if obtained through the standard IRS delivery).  The average annual interest rates for these loans 
range from 67% to an astronomical 774%, depending on the total amount of the refund check.  Id.  
For an average $2,500 loan, the resulting APR would likely range from 85% to 170%.  Fox, supra 
note 18, at 137.  Still, the poor and the unbanked may have more of a market for these services 
precisely because they may be less likely to file online returns and to specify a bank for deposit of 
the refund, both of which would likely speed the refund process. 
6
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B. Initial Regulation: Some State Law Examples for Auto Titles and 
Payday Loans 
1. Auto Title Loans 
Fringe providers target those that are more likely to use their 
services than traditional banks.21  That alone, however, is unremarkable.  
Therefore, the question remains whether the state and federal 
governments should implement regulation to protect individuals from 
such practices.  Before considering that issue later in the Article, it is 
important to first recognize that this industry already has had regulation, 
particularly at the state level, which is sometimes well planned, but 
usually sporadic. 
As a general matter, auto-title loans are a source of credit for 
millions of Americans.22  In an auto-title loan transaction, a borrower 
receives a one-month loan at a higher interest rate and gives the lender a 
security interest in a vehicle.23  As of 2007, the issuance of auto title 
loans was legal in about half of the states within the United States.24  
Some of these states have deregulated rates for licensed lenders, whereas 
others have legislation permitting triple-digit annual interest rates for 
title loans.25  In some states, title lenders use loopholes or operate under 
other lending laws to avoid punishment for illegal behavior.26  Auto-title 
loans have been an issue for policymakers concerned with individuals 
using what, in many cases, is their primary asset and only means of 
transportation as collateral for a loan.27 
2. Refund Anticipation Loans 
Refund anticipation loans (RALs) have also been problematic.  
RALs, however, need not be a large concern because several federal 
agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the FDIC, 
took actions in 2010 and 2011 that effectively have left only one bank, 
working with just two national tax preparation services, to provide this 
form of loan.28  As such, there may no longer be any banks available to 
 
 21.  See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Hawkins, supra note 18, at 537-38. 
 23.  Id. at 538. 
 24.  Fox, supra note 18. 
 25.  Id. at 145. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Hawkins, supra note 18, at 538. 
 28.  In August 2010, the IRS stopped providing tax preparers and banks with the Debt 
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offer refund anticipation loans during the 2012 tax season.29 
3. Payday Loans 
Most states permit high-cost payday lending practices.  Eighteen 
states have prohibited or set very strict caps on interest rates for payday 
lending institutions, while thirty-two states have allowed such practices 
with varying regulation.30  Indeed, many states allow payday lenders to 
charge triple digit interest rates or have no rate cap at all.31  According to 
the Consumer Federation of America, Missouri tops the list with an 
amazing Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”) of 1,950% on a loan in the 
amount of $100 with a two-week maturity.32  While this is the only four 
digit interest rate, several states have no caps at all, including Delaware, 
 
Indicator, a service helping lenders check the credit of taxpayers.  See Press Release, Consumer 
Fed’n of Am., Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr, End in Sight for Quickie Tax Loans: Latest NCLC/CFA 
Report Documents Twilight of the Refund Anticipation Loan (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/2011-RAL-press-release.pdf.  Later in 2010, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency both issued directives prohibiting 
MetaBank, the likely loan partner for Jackson Hewitt (the second largest tax preparation firm), and 
HSBC, the lending bank partner of H&R Block (the largest tax preparation firm), from offering 
refund anticipation loans.  (In 2010, H&R Block ended its contract for tax refund anticipation loans.  
Kristina Peterson, Now Private Company, Jackson Hewitt Plans to Still Offer Tax Loans, DOW 
JONES NEWSWIRES (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.advfn.com/nasdaq/
StockNews.asp?stocknews=RBCAA&article=48768284).  In February 2011, the FDIC notified the 
three remaining state-chartered banks making these loans that offering such loans without the Debt 
Indicator from the IRS is an unsafe and unsound practice.  Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.  As a result, 
two of the three banks announced that they would no longer offer loans after the 2011 tax season, 
while the third bank appealed the decision in the courts.  Id. 
 29.  Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 28.  Jackson Hewitt and Liberty Tax are now the 
only two national tax preparation companies that may offer the loans provided by Kentucky-based 
Republic Bank & Trust, a unit of holding company Republic Bancorp Inc. (RBCAA).  Id.; Peterson, 
supra note 28.  Refund anticipation checks (RACs) will still be available, at a cost to customers who 
temporarily open a bank account simply for the purpose of receiving a tax refund payment, but these 
services are relatively cheap (a fee of approximately $30), offered by traditional banks, and 
presumably could even lead to more of the unbanked deciding instead to save some money short-
term (avoiding the RAC fee) and perhaps also long-term by opening a regular bank account.  Nat. 
Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 28. 
 30.  See PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Loans by State, 
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012).  These numbers have held remarkably steady for the past decade, with just one more state 
prohibiting payday lending in the past 11 years or more.  See Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. 
Lawrence, Payday advance credit in America: An analysis of consumer demand 5 (McDonough 
School of Business, Georgetown University, Monograph No. 35, 2001), available at 
http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/mono35.pdf (noting that 17 states effectively prohibit payday 
lending through strict interest rate ceilings). 
 31.   PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Loans by State, supra note 
30. 
 32.  Id. 
8
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Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin.33 
In contrast, the states that bar extremely high-cost payday lending 
do so through various methods.34  For example, states have applied their 
small loan rate caps to those operating payday outlets, resulting in a 
prohibition of such lending altogether.35  Also, states with less regulation 
related to interest rates may provide statutory limitations through other 
methods, such as by limiting the total loan amount or the number of 
allowable rollover transactions.  For example, Florida permits an APR of 
419% for a fourteen-day $100 loan; however, the maximum loan amount 
is $500 with no rollovers permitted.36  A limit on the number of 
rollovers may be an especially valuable tool for protecting consumers, as 
the rollover transactions often constitute the process that allegedly 
entangles borrowers in a trap of indebtedness.37 
Several states, including Arkansas, New Jersey, and New York, 
have limited loans through the application of their usury laws, which 
dictate the interest rate that can be charged for lending money.38  Thirty-
seven states and the District of Columbia have a payday loan act or a 
small loan statute specifically addressing payday loans.39  These 
enactments are much more specific than the respective states’ general 
usury laws; they apply to payday loan lenders directly.40  Still, many 
fringe banking outlets have attempted to evade usury laws by claiming 
that they are not extending credit or offering loans.41  For example, Betts 
v. McKenzie Check Advance of Florida, LLC, explains how fringe 
lenders characterize “deferred presentment” as a service for a fee instead 
of a loan charging interest.42  Fringe lenders describe the transaction as 
the lender simply holding the check, giving the customer cash, and 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Lending by State: Florida 
State Information, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information/17 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
 37.  Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1398. 
 38.   PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Loans by State, supra note 
30. 
 39.  Payday Lending Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG. (July 11, 2012) 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking-insurance-financial-services/payday-lending-state-
statutes.aspx. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 596. 
 42.  Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC, 879 So.2d 667, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004). 
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promising to refrain from cashing the check for a period of time.43  In 
exchange for its promise to not cash the check, the fringe lender extracts 
a fee from the customer as consideration.44  Fringe banking outlets 
classify the transaction as a whole service and the fee extracted as 
consideration for the service, rather than a charge of interest.45 
Moreover, the ability of fringe banking outlets to evade, if not 
usury laws,46 more general supervision, was enhanced by deregulation of 
the consumer credit marketplace during the 1980s and 1990s.47  
Furthermore, since most of the advertisements for these fringe lenders 
focus on the quick and easy cash aspect, they generally do not contain 
any “trigger terms”48 that would require them to state the APR under the 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).49 
It is likely that states will continue to enact additional, payday loan 
legislation.  As of December 7, 2011, bills were pending in twenty-eight 
state legislatures.50  In 2011, eight states enacted legislation: Arkansas, 
Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and 
 
 43.  See id. at 669. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  Payday loans have also been called “cash advance loans,” “check advance loans,” 
“deferred deposit checks,” “delayed deposit checks,” and “postdated check loans.”  See 12 C.F.R. § 
226(2)(a)(14) (2000); see also Austin v. Ala. Check Cashers Ass’n., 936 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala. 
2005) (referring to payday loans as “deferred presentment transactions”). 
 46.  A number of courts have rejected a fringe banking firm’s attempt to avoid usury 
restrictions.  See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 (E.D. Ky. 1997); Austin v. Ala. 
Check Cashers Ass’n., 936 So. 2d 1014, 1026-27 (Ala. 2005); Betts,928 So. 2d 1204; White v. 
Check Holders Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Ky. 1999).  However, commentators have concluded that 
most state usury laws do not restrict, for example, payday lenders.  See Frank Burt, Farrokh 
Jhabvala, Jason Kairalla & Ari Gerstin,. Refund Anticipation, Payday, and Auto Title Loans: A 
Survey of Select Fringe Lending Products, JORDENBURTLLP, 14-17 (2006), available at 
http://www.jordenburt.com/attachments/489.pdf. 
 47.  Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 596 n.28 (discussing the general rationale for 
deregulation to include proper disclosure and letting the market dictate price). 
 48.  When used in advertisements, certain terms, such as the rate of interest or finance charges 
and member fees, act as triggers, which require further disclosure from the lender to the consumer.  
See David A. Basil & Christian G. Koelbl, Credit Advertising and Related Matters, in AM. BAR 
ASS’N, TRUTH IN LENDING (2003 Supp.).  For instance if a lender advertises a 1% monthly finance 
charge, that “triggers” further disclosure.  Under the Truth in Lending Act, that lender must then 
disclose the APR, any minimum, fixed, transaction or activity charge, and any membership fee.  Id. 
 49.  See generally 12 C.F.R. § 226.16 (discussing the general disclosures necessary with 
respect to advertising using certain terms).  See Truth in Lending Act & Advertising: General 
Information, IN.GOV, available at http://www.in.gov/dfi/2595.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
 50.  Payday Lending 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=22197 (last visited Dec. 14, 2012); see also Payday Lending 2010 
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=19600 (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012) (showing that 26 legislatures had payday loan bills in 2010, with ten of the states enacting 
such laws). 
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Wisconsin.51  While legislators will continue to take various approaches 
as to the best way to regulate this particular fringe service, some 
commentators believe that states need to do much more to protect 
consumers from the presumably outrageous practices of some fringe 
lenders.52  In contrast, some commentators believe that payday lending 
is a necessary evil and not allowing consumers access to such loans 
could lead consumers to face significant problems beyond merely paying 
a high interest rate, such as foreclosure, eviction, and bankruptcy.53 
C. Federal Regulation: The Dodd-Frank Act and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau 
Even greater than the continued state legislative efforts against 
payday lending and the effective end to most refund anticipation loans is 
the federal government’s actions to protect consumers and regulate 
financial services.  In 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
which was the largest financial overhaul since the Great Depression.54  
The stated purpose of the Act is to “promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.”55  The Act spans 2,300 pages 
and creates regulation for a large number of consumer and commercial 
financial products.56 
Especially important for the regulation of fringe products is the 
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) under 
Title X of the Act.57  The Bureau began operation on July 21, 2011 and 
has the authority to regulate nearly all consumer financial products, 
affecting over $14 trillion in consumer debt and services.58  The CFPB’s 
mission is to “make markets for consumer financial products and 
 
 51.  Payday Lending 2011 Legislation, supra note 50. 
 52.  Fox, supra note 18, at 146–49. 
 53.  See Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 607, 615 (2012). 
 54.  B. Rush Smith III, Thad H. Westbrook, & Sarah Nielsen, Litigation Implications of the 
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, 2010-Sept. BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1–5 (2010). 
 55.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 56.  Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection 
Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 119–20 (2011). 
 57.  Id. at 119. 
 58.  Id. 
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services work for Americans, whether they are applying for a mortgage, 
choosing among credit cards, or using any number of other consumer 
financial products.”59  The Bureau plans to “promote fairness and 
transparency”60 for financial products and services and “set and enforce 
clear, consistent rules that allow banks and other consumer financial 
services providers to compete on a level playing field and that let 
consumers see clearly the costs and features of products and services.”61 
Prior to the creation of the Bureau and the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had the authority to 
prohibit actions by financial service providers that were deemed unfair 
or deceptive under the Federal Trade Commission Act.62  However, the 
language of the Dodd-Frank Act now provides that the federal 
government can prevent these providers from engaging in “abusive acts 
or practices.”63  Some argue that this term is too broad of a standard with 
little to no guidance as to its scope and exact definition.64  Others state 
that there is a history of the use of the term in recent federal provisions 
that provide guidance as to what constitutes an abusive practice.65  
Commentators contend that a practice which will fall within the category 
of abuse is the extension of high-risk credit without assessing each 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan.66  If this opinion proves accurate, it 
is the fringe lenders, themselves, who will be especially at risk of 
regulation and discipline by the Bureau unless their practices change. 
D. The Opposite Perspective: The Necessity of Fringe Products 
Despite the negative reputation of fringe banking services, the 
providers of such services offer something of value that many 
individuals would not otherwise be able to access.  Payday lenders allow 
individuals to borrow small sums of money with quick repayment terms, 
a service that typically is unavailable via traditional banks, even for 
those with strong credit ratings.67  For families that are financially 
 
 59.  Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
 60.  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://
www.federalregister.gov/agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Lee, supra note 56, at 119. 
 63.  Id. (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a)). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Barr, supra note 18, at 124-25. 
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strapped, a small loan may be the money needed to survive—as an 
economic unit—for a short period of time.68  For example, a small loan 
can increase a consumer’s general welfare “if the money is used to 
purchase a durable good, like a car or washing machine, that provides 
the consumer with a present-value savings compared to the alternative, 
such as periodic payments for mass transit or taxis or using a 
laundromat.”69  In addition, for many people that use these services, it is 
their only source of legal credit.70  Although loans from these providers 
are expensive, the payment of fees may be preferable to repossession or 
late fees incurred from failure to pay a bill.71 
The ease of obtaining funds from fringe bankers is the dominant 
attribute pushing sales.  For example, an advertisement for National 
Cash Advance proclaims, “[w]hatever the situation, getting a cash 
advance of $100 or more . . . is quick, easy, and hassle free.  Simply 
write us a personal check.  We’ll advance you the cash today and hold 
your check until payday.”72  While such an advertisement surely 
overstates the simplicity of the transaction, individuals in need of a loan 
would likely find the process to be quicker and easier than with a bank.  
Indeed, that is certainly the reason why many small businesses also 
obtain fringe loans.73 
III.  FRINGE BANKING DEMOGRAPHICS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
A. The Demographics of Fringe Consumers 
For a variety of reasons, individuals in low-income households tend 
to be the most common customers of fringe services.  According to the 
United States General Accounting Office, approximately fifty-one 
 
 68.  Charis E. Kubrin, Gregory D. Squires & Steven M. Graves, Does Fringe Banking 
Exacerbate Neighborhood Crime Rates?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2011). 
 69.  Alan M. White, Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons from Microcredit in Developing 
Nations, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1093, 1106 (2012); see also Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory 
Elliehausen, A Comparative Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 22, 
299, 302 (2008). 
 70.  Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1363. 
 71.  John Jagerson, Fringe Banking and Cash America International (CSH), 
TRADINGMARKETS.COM (May 13, 2010, 03:55 PM), http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/
stocks/how_to/articles/Fringe-Banking-and-Cash-America-International-CSH-78055.cfm. 
 72.  Stegman & Faris, supra note 9, at 8. 
 73.  Thomas A. Durkin, The Impact of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency on Small 
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percent of adults earning less than $15,000 per year and thirty-six 
percent of adults making between $15,000 and $30,000 per year do not 
have a basic bank account.74  According to the FDIC, this practice 
results from insufficient financial education, high fees associated with 
banking, and inaccessibility to “mainstream” loans.75  In addition, many 
individuals feel as though they simply do not have enough money to 
make a bank account worthwhile.76 
As advertised online, providers attempt to express their motivation 
as genuine concern for those that are in a “cash dilemma.”77  The 
advertisement lists making a critical math mistake while balancing the 
checking account or having a “big” commission check delayed a week 
as examples that may cause a borrower to be in a cash bind.78  However, 
use of fringe services is most prevalent among the unbanked and low-
income individuals.79  Therefore, it is most likely a rare borrower that 
uses fringe loans to rectify bank account mistakes or to cover delays in 
receiving a large payment. 
For business owners and entrepreneurs, acquiring funds through 
bank loans can prove equally as difficult as for individuals with poor 
credit history, as many traditional lenders will be hesitant to extend 
credit to a business without a strong business credit record.80  This is 
 
 74.  Perez, supra note 1, at 1594. 
 75.  Letter from Jonathan Mintz, New York City Dept. of Consumer Affairs, to Sheila Bair, 
Chairman of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (June 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dca/downloads/pdf/dca_letter_to_fdic_060610.pdf. 
 76.  Ellis, supra note 7. 
 77.  Why Use an Online Payday Loan Service?, PRIVATE FAST CASH, 
http://privatefastcash.com/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  This point does not mean that unbanked and low-income individuals do not effectively 
manage their money.  There is actually empirical literature to the contrary.  See Ronald J. Mann, 
After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for Low- And Middle-Income 
Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729, 740-41 (2012).  According to some commentators, 
“households that use alternative financial services are in fact pretty good managers of their 
money . . . [and low-income] households do an admirable job of balancing use and payments among 
the various credit accounts they hold.”  Id.  Accordingly, the prevalence of fringe banking services 
does not indicate a prevalence of poor money management by the unbanked or low-income. 
 80.  Tracy L. Penwell, The Credit Process: A Guide for Small Business Owners, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/addpub/credit.html (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012).  See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (discussing the Small 
Business Administration data indicating that franchisees have not been relatively successful 
compared to other businesses and that loans to franchisees in fact have high default rates); ROGER 
D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 35 (2005) (noting that the 
data reveal that “business failure is a fact of life . . . just as true for franchisors and franchisees as it 
is for other players in the economy;” concluding, “franchising is no safer on average than 
independent business ownership, and in some cases is actually more risky”). 
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especially true depending on a business’s stage of development.81  
Without access to the financial resources for continuing operations and 
making improvements, businesses suffer a higher risk of death: with 
inadequate finances, these businesses often fold.82 
B. Unconscionability: Skepticism about Fringe Lenders’ Practices 
Fringe banking practices have come under heavy scrutiny.  Most of 
the criticism center around notions of fairness: that fringe service 
providers are acting unconscionably in terms of the individuals they 
target and the interest rates charged.83 
1. Targeted Locations 
Reports indicate that the one factor most strongly associated with 
the ratio of fringe provider locations to the total number of financial 
service providers is poverty: the greater a county’s poverty rate, the 
higher the market share of fringe providers.84  The prevalence of fringe 
providers in low-income locations appears to indicate that the providers 
are well aware of their target market and intentionally choose to operate 
in such areas.  Additionally, individuals without bank accounts are prone 
to the use of fringe products and are largely undereducated, with 
approximately sixty-nine percent of unbanked individuals having only a 
high school education or less.85 
2. Outrageous Interest Rates Charged to the Poorest Consumers 
Not only do fringe bankers often market their products to low-
 
 81.  Penwell, supra note 80.  Penwell discusses four different stages of development in an 
individual’s business and suggests that only those in the third or fourth step in development are in a 
position to approach a traditional lender for a loan.  Id.; see also Durkin, supra note 73, at 2 (noting 
that the newness, small size, or inexperience of a franchised business make it very difficult to get 
any financing). 
 82.  Id.  In its latest survey (August 2012), the National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB) reported that one in five small business owners seeking to meet credit needs were 
unsuccessful in having all their needs met.  Small Business Economic Trends, NAT’L FED’N OF 
INDEP. BUS., http://www.nfib.com/research-foundation/surveys/small-business-economic-trends 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (finding that 31% of those surveyed reported that all of their credit 
needs were met, with seven percent reporting that not all of their credit needs were –satisfied—the 
remainder were not interested in borrowing or did not answer the question).  The survey is limited 
to the perspective of members of the organization, and the survey provides no indication as to the 
methods by which credit was obtained by business owners.  Id. 
 83.  Hawkins & Mann, supra note 15, at 857. 
 84.  Mahon, supra note 4. 
 85.  Perez, supra note 1, at 1594. 
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income individuals,86 but, to make matters even worse, those persons 
with the least income pay the most for their financial services.87  To 
exacerbate the issue, a flood of legislation during the 1990s and early 
2000s left many payday lenders exempt from state usury laws.88  In an 
attempt to curb what some see as a predatory practice, or a structural 
problem, national regulation in the form of consumer protection has 
been proposed.89  As of recent, states have been more aggressive in 
trying to curb fringe lending by attempting to cap the extremely high 
interest rates of fringe lenders90 to ensure that those lenders cannot make 
a profit on short-term loans.91 
Despite these efforts, and given the recently difficult economic 
times, fringe lending is flourishing.92  An individual receiving a net 
annual income of $12,000 can expect to pay $250 a year for these 
services to cash his paycheck.93  The interest rates paid by these same 
individuals for small loans further illustrate the financial burden these 
services place on those that are barely making ends meet.94  An 
individual who receives a payday loan will likely pay 470% APR,95 an 
astronomical figure when considering the much lower interest rates that 
traditional banks charge to their account holders.96  Over time, an over 
 
 86.  See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
 87.  However, given the high risk of such loans, it seems rational that they would have to pay 
higher rates. 
 88.  Hynes, supra note 53, at 625. 
 89.  James H. Carr and Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview at 8, FANNIE MAE 
FOUNDATION (2001), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text_document_summary/
article/relfiles/hot_topics/Carr-Kolluri.pdf  (discussing the need for enhanced enforcement of 
consumer protection laws and improving borrower education regarding loans). 
 90.  Lynn Cowan and Isabel Ordonez, Short-term Lenders Seize the Day: Shares Rise for 
Pawn Shops and Firms Offering Payday Loans as More Borrowers Head Their Way, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 19, 2011, at C4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203658804576639431624988572.html?mod=WSJ_SmallBusiness_LEFTTopSt
ories. 
 91.  Hynes, supra note 53, at 625. 
 92.  Id. at 608.  Small businesses are a large percentage of the fringe banking customer base, 
and an even higher percentage of the total dollars lent.  See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use 
and Government Regulation of Title Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 449 (2010) 
(noting that small businesses constitute up to about 30% of the title loan customers and an even 
higher percentage of the total dollars lent). 
 93.  Perez, supra note 1, at 1597. 
 94.  Id. at 1598. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Dan Weil, 3 ways to get a small-business loan, BANKRATE.COM, 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/personal-finance/3-ways-to-get-a-small-business-loan-1.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012) (noting that interest rates for bank loans to small businesses—typically less 
than the 8% to 15% rate for online loans—are typically at the lowest rate offered, with many banks 
having established reputations as trustworthy lenders). 
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indebted individual could be thrust into default by repeatedly borrowing, 
even if in small amounts.97 
To a certain extent, lenders must charge a steep interest rate to 
account for the relatively high risk of default when dealing with 
individuals that have a poor history of repayment.  However, fringe 
lenders ordinarily do not use credit histories to consider customers’ 
abilities to repay.  In effect, these lenders do not require proof of 
repayment ability and instead rely upon a postdated check or other 
collateral.98  Indeed, their behavior may be considered predatory 
lending, with these creditors having made little or no effort to assess a 
borrower’s credit history while intentionally targeting geographic areas 
whose demographics indicate a population disproportionately filled with 
potential customers that have a poor or nonexistent credit record.99  
Given these circumstances, the lenders must be estopped to deny that all 
their customers should be charged a high interest rate as a matter of the 
creditor’s use of market differentiation (between high credit risk 
customers and lower risk customers).  Undoubtedly, the differentiation 
in price charged to customers is not so much internal (i.e., varying 
within a particular fringe banking company, depending on the customer), 
so much as it is simply traced to an “external” distinction between those 
customers who obtain their financing from the fringe banking entity 
itself and those who can and do bank with a more traditional institution 
(e.g., a bank or credit union). 
While lenders could be required to evaluate borrowers based on 
 
 97.  White, supra note 69, at 1108. 
 98.  Barr, supra note 18, at 166; Hawkins, supra note 5 at 1394, 1401 (stating, “Lenders 
report payday loans to Teletrack, a credit bureau for fringe credit transactions, and lenders check 
Teletrack before extending loans to ensure potential borrowers have not taken out other payday 
loans”; further noting that that fringe lenders “use means other than credit history to ensure 
repayment,” with those methods including collection via collateral or a future paycheck). 
As fringe banking outlets loan only small amounts to customers, the average fringe banking outlet 
has little time or money to gather a consumer’s financial information and to conduct a background 
search on the customer’s financial condition; those expenses in time and money outweigh the 
potential costs savings from weeding out high risk customers.  Search costs also likely prevent 
fringe bankers from splitting their customer pool into different risk categories and charging distinct 
interest rates for each risk pool.  Indeed, fringe bankers might in part be hedging their risk among 
the entire customer pool by charging all customers exorbitant interest rates.  Hawkins, supra note 5, 
at 1399-1400. 
 99.  HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 11 
(2005) (“While risks exist—as in all industries—they are mitigated by loan collateral, excessive 
markup in prices, and the socialization of losses among a class of borrowers.  Put another way, 
enough people will make good on their payday loans to compensate for the bad ones—not difficult, 
given the extremely high industry-wide profit margins.  In short, industry claims about the high 
risks associated with serving marginal populations are exaggerated.”). 
17
Emerson: Franchisees in a Fringe Banking World
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  4:49 PM 
18 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:01 
their ability to repay the loan, as would a traditional bank, this would be 
a challenge when dealing with the typical borrower.  For example, most 
individuals that use fringe lending services do so due to poor credit, 
which creates an inability to borrow from traditional banks.  As a result, 
fringe lenders cannot not use an individual’s credit rating as a tool to 
evaluate a borrower’s ability to repay a loan.  Most ratings of borrowers 
would likely be poor and would exclude lenders from providing loans to 
the vast majority of these individuals.  Additionally, evaluating a 
borrower on the basis of income may prove an ineffective tool for 
assessing the probability of repayment.100  Some lenders have 
recognized the issue with lending solely based on credit scores and these 
lenders have adjusted their practices to include other considerations, 
such as cash flow.101  While this practice may not help the typical fringe 
borrower, it surely would help potential franchisees with no previous 
franchise or brand experience. 
3. Oversimplified Marketing Campaigns 
Perhaps fringe bankers’ marketing campaigns, coupled with their 
arguably unconscionable interest rates and targeting of low-income 
individuals, furnish additional grounds for scrutiny.  One advertisement 
stipulates that the use of a payday loan service allows borrowers to save 
money, save their credit, and save face.102  The evidence seems to 
indicate that individuals using fringe services will pay large fees and 
annual interest rates between 100% and 500%.103  The advertisement, 
therefore, would lead a borrower to believe that using a payday lending 
service will save her money when compared with having to incur fees 
 
 100.  One report indicated that the typical borrower had an annual income of up to $50,000.  
Stegman & Faris, supra note 9, at 15.  Some commentators might find it unfair to allow a fairly 
illiquid or perhaps nearly insolvent individual with an annual salary of $50,000 to obtain a loan and 
not the individual making $30,000 per year even if that individual is in a better financial position 
overall.  While salary may be one tool to analyze the likelihood of repayment, it surely falls short of 
a complete analysis.  The individual making less annually may have fewer financial obligations and 
be in a better position to repay the loan than the individual who has a greater salary.  A formula that 
encapsulates this idea and thus better assesses an individual’s likelihood of repayment, is: Effective 
Gross Income (EGI) plus Other Investments/Collateral minus Total Obligations equals Net Income 
(ability to repay). 
 101.  Robb Mandelbaum, Providing Loans Based on Cash Flow, Not Credit Score, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/business/smallbusiness/
06sbiz.html?ref=paydayloans. 
 102.  Payday Loans Review, TOPTENREVIEWS, http://payday-loan-service-
review.toptenreviews.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
 103.  HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY xiii, 5 
(2005). 
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associated with a late bill payment.104  Similarly, the advertisement 
appeals to the borrower’s concern for his credit, as it states that 
obtaining a payday loan will prevent an individual from receiving “bad 
marks” to his credit record by paying a bill after its due date.105  This 
reasoning is backwards, as many users of fringe products obtain a fringe 
loan due to a poor or nonexistent credit rating, not for the purpose of 
protecting the rating.106  Finally, the advertisement appeals to borrowers’ 
emotions: suggesting that a payday loan can protect borrowers’ personal 
and business relationships by helping borrowers avoid asking relatives 
or friends for money.107  While most would agree that asking for a loan 
from a family member or a friend can be embarrassing,108 the 
advertisement seems to unnecessarily invoke fear in individuals strapped 
for cash.109  By way of comparison, in Australia, “the credit squeeze has 
forced new franchisees to borrow from their parents, family and friends 
to get into business;”110 if Aussies can do that, why should Americans 
shy away?111  Indeed, in a difficult economic climate, some franchisors 
 
 104.  Payday Loans Review, supra note 102. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Indeed, the payday loan may just make things worse.  Consider a small business and its 
recurring transaction costs for a payday loan: 
(1) Typically it is advanced 10%–15% of the company’s average monthly revenue; 
(2) The loan is personally guaranteed by the owner; 
(3) Every thirty days the costs occur again; and 
(4) For a year-long arrangement, the business would incur $1,200 in fees on a $1,000 
loan. 
Payday Loans & Your Biz: Payday Loans Can Ruin Your Credit and Cost You Dearly in Interest 
and Hidden Fees, MSN BUSINESS ON MAIN, http://bom.msn.com/Article.aspx?id=26643792 (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
In sum, “Borrowing money from a payday lender—especially for business—is like walking into 
quicksand.  The longer you’re in the hole, the deeper you sink into debt and despair.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 107.  Payday Loans Review, supra note 102. 
 108.  Of course, family members or friends may not be an available source of funds for the 
simple reason that these persons have no more access to funds or credit than does the franchisee.  
JOHN P CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 68-77 
(1994). 
 109.  Zywicki, supra note 92, at 454–55 (discussing survey results as well as social and 
psychological issues involved in borrowing money, or not seeking to borrow money, from family or 
friends). 
 110.  Claire Heaney, Getting a Franchise Grows Tougher, THE MERCURY (HOBART), Oct. 7, 
2010, at 22. 
 111.  Perhaps Australians are inclined to turn to family and friends when they need funds 
because they actually understand the alternative in the form of loans that fringe lenders would offer.  
Australia’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), which was adopted in 1994, is intended to 
make Australia’s fringe banking rates transparent to borrowers.  Infosys Technologies Ltd., supra 
note 7, at 16.  Credit providers in Australia are required “to disclose all relevant terms and 
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are doing more to line up financing.112 
IV.  SMALL BUSINESSES AS FRINGE BANKING CUSTOMERS: THE 
FRANCHISEE EXPERIENCE 
Car title loans are a product of the ubiquitous “bad credit, no credit, 
no problem” advertisements offered by lenders.113  In exchange for the 
small loan that a borrower could not get at a bank, the lender requires a 
high interest rate and the title of the borrower’s car as collateral; in 
comparison to the already steep interest rates that credit card companies 
may charge, car title loans can legally be over ten times higher—as 
much as 250% or more.114  Of course, whether these loans are for 
personal debt or for business matters, the amounts owed—and the total 
payments expected—can be exorbitant, as borrowers struggle simply to 
pay interest while making little headway in reducing the outstanding 
principal.  For example, a car title borrower paid $400 a month for seven 
months ($2800) just to pay off the accumulated interest on her $3000 
 
conditions including annual interest rates before entering into a contract and ensure that borrowers 
receive adequate copies of loan documentation.  Id.  There is also a requirement of disclosure of 
annual interest rates in advertisements.  Despite the regulation, fringe banking has been a 
significantly growing part of the Australian financial sector.  Id. at 4 . 
 112.  Sarah E. Needleman, Franchisers Focus on Loans: Amid Weak Small-Business Lending, 
Franchisers Help Franchisees Get Loans, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:26 PM ET) 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903366504576486173595440098.html (reporting, 
“Thirty-nine percent of franchisers said more than half of their franchisees and franchise prospects 
were unable to obtain needed financing, according to a March [2011] survey of 147 franchisers by 
International Franchise Association, a trade group;” in response, some franchisors are taking more 
active roles to find financing for their struggling franchisees, and many businesses have formed with 
the purpose of connecting franchisees and their franchisor in order to arrange financing).  For 
example, the franchised restaurant chain Wingstop has had financing arrangements with Franchise 
America Finance and The Bancorp Bank—securing $15 million for franchise lending to new and 
existing franchisees.  Steven R. Thompson, Wingstop Secures $15 million for Franchise Lending, 
DALLAS BUS. J. (Dec. 1, 2011, 12:33PM CST), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/
2011/12/01/wingstop-secures-15-million-for.html.  Furthermore, franchisor GNC has also promoted 
how it seeks to do as much as possible to provide direct financing to its franchisees.  Frequently 
Asked Questions, GNC LIVE WELL, http://www.gncfranchising.com/dom_faq.asp#q9 (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2012). 
 113.  Christopher Neiger, Car Title Loans a Problem: Fast Cash and Big Problems, AOL 
AUTOS (Oct. 14, 2008), http://autos.aol.com/article/car-title-loans/; see also Christopher Neiger, 
Fast cash, big problems with car title loans, CNN LIVING (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-26/living/title.loans_1_title-loan-interest-rates-responsible-
lending?_s=PM:LIVING. 
 114.  In addition to these high interest rates, multiple mandatory fees are standard, thereby 
making it that much harder for cash-strapped borrowers to escape the piling debt.  Car Title Loans a 
Problem, supra note 113 (noting that such fees include processing, document, late, origination, and 
and lien fees). 
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loan.115  After those grueling payments she was still at square one, with 
the full loan to pay back.116  Indeed, this outcome is the ordinary result 
of loan terms “crafted to keep borrowers in a cycle of debt and bring 
customers either to the verge of repossession or to actual 
repossession.”117 
The horror stories are not limited to a particular type of loan.  
Besides auto title loans, payday loans, with nearly $11 billion lent online 
in 2010,118 serve as an economic “lifeline.”119  Just as often though, 
these payday loans serve as a debt sentence.  Ramon Zayas had bills 
piling up from the treatment for his prostate cancer, so Zayas and his 
wife decided to take out a $250 loan from 500 FASTCASH at a 476% 
annual percent interest rate.120  The money was used in order to pay the 
Zayas’ electricity bill, and Ramon Zayas believed he was paying off the 
loan.  However, confusing fees and enormous rates transformed his 
payments to $125 a month (half of the original loan).121  While Zayas 
thought he would be paying, in effect, thirty percent interest while 
paying off the loan within a few months,122 he actually paid far more 
interest than principal.123  Despite the fact that eighteen states have 
proscribed payday lending,124 500 FASTCASH and over two dozen 
other online payday lenders have been shielded from state laws because 
they are owned by American Indian tribes.125 
A. The Effects of Regulation on Consumers 
When considering regulation of fringe services, we must 
contemplate the effect on individuals and businesses that rely on the 
credit obtained thereby.  If regulations restrict access to these services, 
many people will be without a form of credit when they desperately need 
it to survive.126  Even those that support the regulation of abusive 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Armen Keteyian, How “payday” lenders pull off crippling rates, CBS EVENING NEWS 
(Sept. 26 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-20111913.html. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id.  (“I borrowed $250 [and] thought I was going to pay $325,” Zayas said). 
 123.  Id.  (Zayas ended up paying $700 on a $250 loan, “but it would have been $1,100 had 
[he] not gone to the bank and put a stop to this”). 
 124.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 125.  Keteyian, supra note 118. 
 126.  Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1363. 
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practices acknowledge that it is likely to harm the “economically 
disadvantaged disproportionately,” due to their already limited access to 
loans.127  The irony of such regulation is that it is purported to protect 
individuals and businesses from the potentially harmful practices of 
financial providers, yet the regulation itself may cause more harm than 
good to those who are most in need.128 
Consider whether fringe lending actually produces financial 
distress.129  Many fringe banking products (rent-to-own, pawning of 
goods, and title lending) are structured so that borrowers can “escape” 
their debt by walking away and only losing the equity they put in as well 
as their collateral.  Most loans are for small amounts and, in pawn shops 
especially, the negative consequence from losing the collateral is often 
emotional rather than financial, such as losing a family heirloom, yet 
losing access to such a loan could cause financial distress by not being 
able to use the money (e.g., the pawnbroker’s loan) to pay off other bills 
and debts.130  Though structured differently from other fringe banking 
products, payday loans still operate in a similar manner in that loan 
amounts are capped at a relatively low number: the amount of a 
biweekly pay check.131 
Perhaps there could be alternative sources of credit.  For consumers 
these sources might be: loans from family and friends directly, use of 
credit cards to finance bills and purchases, home equity refinancing 
(assuming the consumer owns a home), and offering a family member’s 
or friend’s guarantee on a traditional loan.  Further methods of credit 
could be the buying of inventory or equipment with a purchase-money 
security interest,132 having corporate owners provide personal guarantees 
on loans, the offering of unencumbered assets as collateral, and, in the 
worst case scenario, filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and obtaining credit 
during reorganization.133  If consumers and businesses have already 
 
 127.  Lee, supra note 56, at 121. 
 128.  DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 14-15 (2011).  The Dodd-Frank Act and creation of the 
Bureau will likely lead to an increase in litigation against financial service providers, as the Bureau 
has the authority to pursue a civil action for violation of the federal consumer financial laws.  Smith, 
Westbrook, & Nielsen, supra note 54, at 5.  In addition, these providers are likely to be subjected to 
more civil or administrative actions based on the consumer protection regulations that the CFPB 
promulgates.  Id. 
 129.  Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1386–98. 
 130.  Id. at 1390. 
 131.  Id. at 1394. 
 132.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009) (defining purchase-money security 
interest). 
 133.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2010). 
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exhausted the above sources, they may have no alternative to fringe 
financing.  Consumers and small business owners in a financial crunch 
ordinarily will have little or no knowledge or other resources to pursue 
alternate credit sources, nor will they have time to educate themselves 
about more sophisticated forms of credit. 
Perhaps a reason alternative credit sources are not utilized by 
individuals is because they prefer the fringe banking products’ more 
convenient environment than for mainstream institutions.134  At any rate, 
the formal alternatives, such as bank loans, are usually unavailable to 
pawn shop customers because they would not, with their credit ratings, 
qualify for a loan.135 
There is evidence that customers of fringe outlets feel as though 
these businesses meet their needs better than mainstream institutions.136  
One focus group report indicated that check cashers were superior to 
banks with regard to their access to immediate cash, locations, service, 
respect of the customer, and trustworthiness.137  More interestingly, 
some focus group members indicated that the pricing policies of check 
cashers were more transparent than the policies of banks.138  These 
individuals valued the ability to use check cashers without any 
obligation to continue a relationship on the part of the borrower.139  
Thus, the focus group illustrates that there are aspects of fringe lending 
services that are appealing, regardless of the high fees that may be 
charged.  The consumer preference for these services must be considered 
when determining the appropriate levels of regulation for fringe banking. 
If lenders provide cash for individuals in genuine emergency 
situations, and do not simply prey on debtors’ chronic mismanagement 
of funds, it is arguable that they should not be subject to more 
regulation.  Assisting those in need in times of crisis or when an 
unexpected expense occurs is a worthy service, with the sole principal 
 
 134.  Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, Introduction to Focus Issue: Use of Financial 
Services by Low-Income Households, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 3, 4 (Feb. 2003) (citing DAVID CAPLOVITZ, 
THE POOR PAY MORE 34 (1963)).  In order to fight the convenience of fringe banks that are check 
cashers, grocery stores and “regular” banks increasingly have acted as alternatives—the stores 
providing check cashing free to their customers and the banks cashing checks free of charge if the 
check originated from that bank.  See Ebonya Washington, The Impact of Banking and Fringe 
Banking Regulation on the Number of Unbanked Americans, 41 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 106 (2006). 
 135.  CASKEY, supra note 108, at 70.  Even if pawn shop “banking” is a market reality, there 
may be useful reforms of its operations. 
 136.  Stegman & Faris, supra note 9, at 13. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
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objection being the price of the service.140  This is especially so when 
these individuals in crisis have no other practical source to obtain 
cash.141 
Greater regulation may result in fewer fringe providers.  If a 
consumer obtains funds outside of fringe banking, she might be driven to 
independent loan sharks with the stereotypical bat in hand enforcing 
interest rates that are likely unregulated.  As for approaching family 
members and friends, hat in hand and begging for cash, clearly that can 
be detrimental to one’s self worth and personal relationships.142  In 
addition, this alternative presumes that one has family members and 
friends available and that those individuals are in a financial position to 
be able to lend. 
In the business context, business owners might be hesitant to 
provide further personal guarantees or offer their own possessions and 
homes as collateral for loans when they might already be loaded down 
with other debts.  To take away the alternative financing available 
through fringe banking is to remove some businessperson autonomy and 
perhaps even induce criminality.143  Indeed, the alternate sources of 
credit might trigger more damage to small business debtors or to 
consumers than fringe financing produces.144 
 
 140.  At that point, we may be in the position of the old joke about prostitution or any other so-
called victimless crime that, once you accept even the lightest variation from an absolute, morals-
based prohibition, then all you are doing is arguing over price. 
 141.  For example, fringe banking outlets may be the sole, legitimate stopgap measure to 
financially distressed consumers.  See supra Part II.A. 
 142.  For general information about seeking business financing, see Asheesh Advani, Deciding 
Whom to Ask for Money, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/83792 (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
 143.  Todd J. Zywicki & Astrid Arca, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday Lending, 
MERCATUS ON POLICY 3 (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/MOP64_FMWG_Payday%20Lending_web.pdf(no
ting the possibility of a rise in illegal loan sharking controlled by organized crime, such as what 
happened in Japan following a 2006 tightening of consumer lending regulations). 
 144.  The unavailability of fringe providers could drive consumers to less desirable, and 
possibly even illegal, options.  See e.g., Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. 
REV. 979, 1004 (2012) (discussing generally how excessive debt can harm one’s welfare).  One 
such undesirable choice, resorting to pawn shops, imposes costs on the debtor  “comparable to 
payday loans, but [with the borrower required] to part with personal property to use as collateral.”  
Zywicki & Arca, supra note 143, at 2.  Also, “because of the small size ($76 on average) and high 
transaction cost of pawn shop loans, these are of limited usefulness in managing financial 
difficulties.”  Id. at 2-3. 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/1
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  4:49 PM 
2013] FRANCHISEES IN A FRINGE BANKING WORLD 25 
B. Consider the Franchisee 
1. Fringe Banking Services Franchisees and Their Own Financing 
Perhaps the best ways to determine a fringe lender’s true 
perspective on its loans is to see its response to the use of such loans by 
individuals or entities in which the lender has a vested interest.  For 
example, many fringe banking outlets are owned and operated as a 
member of a franchise network.145  If the fringe lenders truly believed in 
their product as a credible source of financing and not a precarious, 
overpriced loan, presumably they would allow their franchisees to utilize 
such services to obtain some or all of the funds necessary to purchase the 
franchise right. 
The example of Cash Plus, Inc. may prove instructive.  Cash Plus 
provides check cashing, payday advance loans, and other financial 
services,146 and it posts extensive information on its website regarding 
its franchise opportunities.147  While its standard franchise agreement 
does not specifically prohibit the use of fringe financing to acquire 
franchise purchase funds, the contract does state that the “method of 
payment specified by Franchisor may include Automated Clearing 
House (ACH) direct electronic bank debit system, certified check, bank 
or other financial-institution check or any other method as Franchisor 
may designate.”148  It seems clear that the franchise agreement 
anticipates that payments from the franchisee will be made in the most 
formal way through a standard bank transaction.  Interestingly, while its 
website states that its customers have been “underserved by banks,” the 
franchisor, as a business, acknowledges the necessity and credibility of 
standard bank payments.149  Such a clause for most or all fringe banking 
 
 145.  See, e.g., FAMILY FINANCIAL CENTERS, http://www.familyfinancialcenters.com/ (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
 146.  CASH PLUS, http://www.cashplusinc.com/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
 147.  Cash Plus Franchise Info Franchise Facts, CASH PLUS, 
http://www.cashplusinc.com/franchise_info_ffacts.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
 148.  Sample Franchise Agreement, CASH PLUS, FREE FRANCHISE DOCS, 
http://www.freefranchisedocs.com/cash-plus-inc-Franchise-Agreement.php  (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012). 
 149.  Cash Plus Franchise Info Franchise Facts, CASH PLUS, 
http://www.cashplusinc.com/franchise_info_ffacts.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).  A fringe 
banking franchisor targets a different audience in franchise agreements than in its product 
advertisements.  Perhaps the franchisor expects a higher level of financial stability and 
sophistication in its franchisees than in its product customers.  So, while that difference in approach 
between franchisee “customers” and actual fringe banking customers may sound ironic or even 
hypocritical, the more exact payment terms in the franchise agreement may merely reflect the 
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service franchisors is highly likely, as contract provisions strongly and 
almost universally in favor of a franchisor have long been the norm in 
American franchising.150 
2. Franchisees’ Use of Fringe Banking 
While much of the discussion surrounding fringe banking practices 
focuses on individual consumers’ use of such products, the business 
community is not immune from the uses of and issues associated with 
fringe banking.  For example, business owners may need fringe lending 
services to cover unforeseen expenses or to fill the gap if receipt of a 
payment is delayed.  With the typical start-up business requiring, on 
average, about $25,000,151 a loan providing a few thousand dollars may 
serve a vital role in allowing the entrepreneur to get off the ground.  That 
may especially be the case for franchising, where different sources often 
can be cobbled together to help the debtor-franchisee commence 
operations, even if any particular source of funds is problematic.  Such 
sources could be the franchisor itself, a traditional bank, a credit union, a 
landlord, and third-party suppliers.152  Another potential financing 
avenue for franchisees is to seek a franchise-funding specialist.  Doing 
so typically involves companies that have a relationship with particular 
lenders specializing in franchise financing.153  Alternatively, if the 
franchisor allegedly misled, or at least negligently informed, the 
franchisee about her estimated start-up costs, then the franchisee could 
 
franchisor’s trying to attract more financially stable franchisees rather than the franchisor’s 
exhibiting a distrust of its own products for consumer debtors. 
 150.  See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of 
Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C.L. REV. 905 (1994) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise 
Contract Clauses]; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard 
Approach (2012) (forthcoming) (on file with author) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise Contract 
Interpretation]. 
 151.  SCOTT A. SHANE, THE ILLUSIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE COSTLY MYTHS THAT 
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND POLICY MAKERS LIVE BY 79–80, 95 (2008) (noting three 
studies from the late 1990s arriving at figures of $15,000, of $20,000 or of $22,700; estimating the 
start-up total to be “$24,920 in today’s dollars”). 
 152.  See W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE §§4:4–
4:16 (2012) (describing the franchisee-landlord relationship, third-party suppliers and financing, and 
guarantees, pledges, and inventory as well as other forms of financing). 
 153.  Jeff Eglin, 3 Sources of Franchise Financing: Know How to Make Sense of the Current 
Economy and Its Impact on Fringe Banking, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 3, 2008), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/198310.  Typically these companies will obtain your 
financials, advise you as to your lending options, and help you throughout the lending process 
without charging a fee unless you actually receive the loan.  Id. 
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successfully sue the franchisor for that wrongful disclosure.154  In fact, 
when securing Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loans, several 
franchisees have been hurt by their franchisors’ overly optimistic 
financial projections.155 
Statistics indicate that access to high-cost credit such as auto title 
loans is an important aspect of the success of small business.156  Indeed, 
most small businesses use consumer lending to help finance their 
business, as these often are more expensive,157 but faster and more 
convenient sources of credit.158  Consumer lending can cover everything 
from seed capital for starting a business to the management of monthly 
cash flows, in addition to providing working capital.159  As one 
economist specializing in the regulation of consumer financial services 
has noted, “[m]any of these businesses [that obtain “consumer” 
financing] do not have access to a commercial line of credit, often 
because they are too small or too new.”160  Even those businesses that 
can get the more traditional business financing use consumer loan 
products to supplement their commercial credit.161  In fact, small 
businesses make up twenty-five to thirty percent of the customer base 
for title loans, and an even higher percentage of the total dollars 
loaned.162 
C. Lost Opportunities for Franchisees 
Many prospective franchisees, looking to purchase the rights to 
operate under an established franchise system, can find startup costs 
under $10,000.163  For franchises such as Jazzercise, Inc., and Stratus 
 
 154.  David A. Beyer & Scott P. Weber, Estimated Initial Investment Claims: Strict Liability or 
Strictly Folly?, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 103, 104 (2000). 
 155.  Don Sniegowski, Advice on SBA Liar Loans, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10713/part_3_lenders_give_advice_sba_liar_loans (advising 
franchisees to verify franchise numbers and to engage in due diligence before taking out franchise 
loans). 
 156.  Durkin, supra note 73, at 2. 
 157.  Id. at 19. 
 158.  Zywicki, supra note 92, at 449.  Professor Zywicki explains why small businesses, such 
as landscapers, plumbers, and handymen, may go through a series of high-in-transactional-costs, 
short-term loans pledging a motor vehicle title.  Id. at 448–49. 
 159.  Durkin, supra note 73, at 2. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Zywicki, supra note 92, at 449. 
 163.  2012 Low-Cost Franchises: 100 franchises for under $50,000: Top 10 Low Cost 
Franchises for 2012, ENTREPRENEUR, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/
lowcost/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).  For all franchised systems, not just those with low start-up 
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Building Solutions, two low-cost franchises (with startup costs as low as 
$3,000 to $3,500) ranked within the top thirteen franchises according to 
Entrepreneur Media,164 there is the potential to use fringe loans for 
filling any gaps in capital.  A fringe loan, perhaps from an auto title loan 
or a payday advance, could provide a franchisee with the potential to 
operate her own business when she would otherwise not have the 
funds.165  The financing of even a small amount could be a real key to 
success for someone seeking to join an accomplished, often lucrative 
business network (franchise system)—someone (the franchise applicant) 
not normally thought of when considering the fringe banking industry 
and its traditional customers.166  Recent data tend to show that while 
small business lending has increased, small business owners are still 
having problems obtaining nominal loans ($150,000 or below) to get 
their businesses started.167  This is precisely the issue that potential 
franchisees face because these are the types of loans they need to 
procure to start-up their businesses. 
These figures, however, do not to say that franchisors play no part 
in helping franchisees obtain financing for their start-up costs.  Some 
franchisors hire executives specifically dedicated to assisting franchisees 
obtain loans and also pay for services that match franchisees with 
lenders.168  Given the recent recession and inability to get credit, some 
franchisors have been more aggressive than ever in helping franchisees 
 
costs, the initial franchise fee that the franchisee must pay the franchisor (a part of the start-up costs) 
is a median charge of $20,000.  BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 80, at 59. 
 164.  2012 Franchise 500 Rankings, ENTREPRENEUR, available at http://
www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/rankings/franchise500-115608/2012,-1.html (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012). 
 165.  Perhaps this has led to more franchisors directly extending financing to their franchisees.  
See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text (on small business financing, such as 
through auto title loans).  As small businesses increasingly have turned to cash advances when 
banks have turned them down, a proposal has been the Small Business Lending Enhancement Act 
of 2011 (S. 509), currently in committee.  This bill would amend the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795k (2011) and thereby permit many credit unions to expand considerably the 
credit they make available via member business loans.  It would certainly assist in having some 
small businesses, including franchisees, avoid fringe lending and obtain more traditional, safe, 
sound, and lower-cost loans.  See The Small Business Lending Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 509, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 167.  Emily Maltby, Small-Business Lending Jumps, But Credit Struggles Linger, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 5, 2011 1:24 p.m. ET) http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203388804576612950561189010.html?mod=WSJ_SmallBusiness_sections_Fi
nancingAndInvesting (discussing the incentive banks have to approve higher loans due to the 
amount of work needed to process loans and limited number they can approve). 
 168.  See Needleman, supra note 112 (discussing the various methods that franchisors use to 
help franchisees secure loans). 
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obtain financing, including direct financing from the franchisor.169  Due 
to faith in the franchise model, lenders in fact often require less due 
diligence when assessing a franchisee’s ability to repay.170  However, the 
presumption that franchises are a safe bet has been recently dispelled, in 
strong fashion, by the high default rates on SBA-backed loans for 
franchisees.171  Consequently, lenders are scrutinizing franchise loans 
more carefully now than they have in the past.172  Indeed, some 
franchising experts comment that franchisors need to be extremely 
careful about lending so that new business operators-owners can buy 
into their system: these experts blame some franchisors’ business 
difficulties on the franchisors’ putting efforts into expansion through 
financing of franchisees rather than concentrating on the success of the 
existing operations.173 
Use of fringe products by business owners and franchisees is 
amplified by the difficulty in obtaining credit through standard means.174  
For instance, recent data show that small business lending has been on a 
 
 169.  Kermit Pattison, Tight Credit Is Turning Franchisors Into Lenders, N.Y. TIMES (June 9. 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/business/smallbusiness/10sbiz.html?ref=franchising 
(also mentioning other ways that franchisors are helping franchisees, including reducing royalties, 
fees, or other general requirements). 
 170.  But see BMM, SBA Rebukes Banco Popular for Liar Loans, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Aug. 
12, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/10628/sba_rebukes_banco_popular_liar_loans 
(discussing franchisee defaults on SBA loans due to lack of credible information and lender 
oversight). 
 171.  Infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 172.  Don Sniegowski, SBA Franchise Lenders Hit, BLUEMAMAU.ORG (Sept. 30, 2011, 1:29 
AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/10727/national_franchise_lenders_hit_hard_change_model 
(discussing how SBA lenders were harmed by franchisee loans and the steps they are taking to 
correct past mistakes). 
 173.  See, e.g., April Y. Pennington, Financing Facts: Is it tougher to find franchises that 
finance? ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/66044 (comments 
of Professor Scott Shane that Boston Market’s bankruptcy issues arose in large part from the fact 
that the franchisor “became a finance company and not an operating company”).  For discussion of 
the use of experts in franchise dispute resolution, see Robert W. Emerson, Expert as 
Ringmaster: Amplifying Arguments in a Franchising Dispute (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 174.  That may especially be the case in light of the poor economy for the past few years.  
Even in a good economy, there are a number of reasons why a particular business might find credit 
hard to obtain: (1) banks’ unwillingness to carry an additional high risk borrower on their lending 
portfolios; (2) for a start-up business, difficulties in obtaining a thorough credit history; and (3) for a 
going concern, a borrowing business might already have collateralized its assets to secure previous 
debts, or it has inventory already encumbered by other purchase money debts, or the owners might 
have already personally guaranteed too many previous debts (a new lender would have no first or 
even second priority position).  In sum, the inability to get credit stems from there being too little 
information to evaluate a new business and too little, if any, possible collateral for lending to a 
going concern. 
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steady decline.175  Moreover, franchise loans, in general, do not seem to 
ensure protection for the franchisor or the franchisee, at least vis-à-vis 
loans for other business formats; while all business loans from 2001–
2006 had a failure rate of 5.9%, franchise loans actually failed at a 
higher rate of 6.5%.176  These figures should not be surprising, however, 
as at least one study has shown that franchisees actually average a 
business failure rate higher than that of independent businesses.177 
Although there is a plethora of law discussing “sophisticated 
franchisees,”178 no court has specifically delineated the distinction 
between these franchisees and their unsophisticated counterparts.179  The 
 
 175.  Small Business Lending Declines, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Oct. 14, 2011, 9:57 AM), 
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10778/small_business_lending_declines; see also Small Business 
Lending in the United States, 2009-2010, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (U.S Small Business 
Administration), Feb. 2011, at 3, available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/
sbl_10study.pdf. 
 176.  Laura Tutor, The It List: Companies on the Small Business Administration’s Franchise 
Registry have Lower Loan Failure Rates than National Average, QSR MAG., available at  
http://www2.qsrmagazine.com/articles/features/108/sba-1.phtml (reporting statistics from 
FRANdata President Darrell Johnson, including, inter alia, that the rate of charge-offs and loan loss 
for Small Business Administration Franchise Registry companies is lower than business as a whole, 
with loans coming through the Franchise Registry having a rate of 5.7%). 
 177.  Timothy Bates, A Comparison of Franchise and Independent Small Business Survival 
Rates, 7 SMALL BUS. ECON. 377 (1995); Timothy Bates, Analysis of Survival Rates Among 
Franchise and Independent Small Business Startups, 13 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 113 (1995).  Bates 
observed a 34.7% failure rate for franchised business over a five-year span, but only a 28% rate, in 
the same time period, for independents. 
 178.  One example would be Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 
740 (W.D. Ky. 2004).  There, the defendant franchisees, having been sued for breach of a franchise 
contract, counterclaimed against Papa John’s for fraudulent inducement, specifically, that false oral 
representations by a representative of Papa John’s caused the premature closing of defendant’s 
restaurants.  Id. at 744.  The parties, two corporations, entered into a number of franchise 
agreements during their transactions, which contained merger and integration clauses that provided 
that the written agreement contained the entire agreement between the parties and superseded all 
prior understandings or agreements.  Id. at 744.  The court held, “if any misrepresentations 
fraudulently induced Defendants into entering the Development Agreement, i.e., misrepresentation 
made prior to the signing of the agreement, the merger and integration clause prevents this action 
from being brought.”  Id. at 745.  The court placed emphasis on the fact that the contract had been 
agreed upon by two sophisticated parties.  Id.; see also Owens v. Cumberland Mortg., Inc., No. 
1:05-CV-135R, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83667, at *13–14 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2006) (distinguishing 
Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza, which involved mutually sophisticated parties, and 
thereby holding that unsophisticated home mortgagors could assert their claim of fraud against the 
sophisticated business defendant, a mortgage brokerage). 
 179.  See infra note 227 and accompanying text.  Three examples of cases in which courts 
found against franchisees claiming franchisor fraud, at least in part because of the franchisee’s own 
sophistication, are: Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, 970 
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that business people who purchased a franchise as an 
investment opportunity were sophisticated franchisees); North Am. Fin. Group, Ltd. v. S.M.R. 
Enters., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that a franchisee with a background in 
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law’s presumption (or at least a number of court findings on the facts) 
that franchisees are generally “sophisticated” can be understood in light 
of some general requirements for becoming a franchisee.  For instance, 
the APlus® franchise lists several requirements that it expects potential 
franchisees to have, including the ability to make and implement a 
business plan along with a minimum investment of two hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars.180  While this is just one example, one could argue 
that an individual needs a certain level of sophistication before entering 
into such an agreement.181  The FTC Franchise Rule and some state 
statutes allude to such a distinction.182  As noted in the revised FTC 
Franchise Rule, there is a “sophisticated franchisee” exemption that frees 
franchisors from the need to provide disclosure to sophisticated 
franchisees.183  Nonetheless, the Rule does not explicitly define a 
“sophisticated franchisee.”184  A California statute also attempts to make 
 
investments was sophisticated); Payne v. McDonald’s Corp., 957 F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Md. 1997) 
(finding a franchisee sophisticated due to its extensive knowledge of the franchisor’s business).  
Two examples of courts holding in favor of franchisees that might be deemed “unsophisticated” are 
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting the inequality in 
power generally favoring franchisors over franchisees, as well as the “substantially weaker 
bargaining position” of the franchisee vis-à-vis the franchisor in that particular case—a franchisee 
with a yearly salary of around $100,000, someone who had “never owned her own business,” versus 
a franchisor parent company with over $208,000,000 in assets and over one billion dollars in 
revenues), and Fisher v. Mr. Harold’s Hair Lab, Inc., 527 P.2d 1026, 1034 (Kan. 1974) (discussing 
the unequal bargaining power of the parties).  See also AM. JUR. 2D PRIVATE FRANCHISE 
CONTRACTS § 260 (1990) (discussing that franchisee may not be able to claim reasonable 
reliance when franchisee is a sophisticated investor). 
 180.  Sunoco APlus® Franchise: Franchise Requirements, SUNOCOINC.COM, 
http://www.sunocoinc.com/retail/partner-with-sunoco/franchise-requirements (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012). 
 181.  All franchise agreements, of course, involve business relationships and, as such, are 
distinguishable from consumer contracts, which receive stricter review by the courts in favor of the 
consumer.  All prospective franchisees must understand that would be opening a business and 
taking a risk.  Their willingness to take the risk is probably, but not always, supported by analysis of 
and reflection upon an array of information available from the franchisor in making their decision to 
own and operate a franchise.  For more analysis of franchisees and sophistication, see Emerson, 
Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra note 150, at 34-40; Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and 
the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author). 
 182.  Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444 
(Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436-37) (2009) [hereinafter, FTC Disclosure 
Requirements and Prohibition]; GARNER, supra note 152, at § 5A:32 (discussing state exemptions in 
which (1) the franchisee is experienced in that business, Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
445.1506(1)(h) (2010)), or (2) the initial minimum investment of a franchisee is $750,000, 
Maryland (MD. CODE REGS. tit. 02, § 02.02.08.10E (2010))). 
 183.  Infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See David J. Kaufmann, The New York Franchise Act, 2007–2008, 20 MCKINNEY’S 
GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 33 (2009).  Notably, the FTC Rule does not explicitly enumerate this as 
the “sophisticated franchisee” exemption but rather states that a franchisee who has “been in 
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the distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated franchisees 
with respect to disclosure requirements of franchisees by denoting such 
franchisees as “experienced” rather than “sophisticated.”185 
As discussed above,186 franchise applicants may not have the 
chances to acquire and then successfully build upon a business 
opportunity.  Surely an advanced judicial, regulatory, and contractual 
(i.e., franchisor) approach to sophistication could produce better 
financing and greater opportunities for potential franchisees.187 
D. The Importance of Insulating Businesses from Consumer-Oriented 
Protections 
Seemingly, with every chance for profit comes as well the prospect 
of litigation.  There are many ways that financing, or a lack thereof, can 
cause franchise disputes.  One can easily foresee controversies in the 
financing of franchise investments if, generally, the franchising concept 
fails or if, in particular, the business for one or more of the franchisees 
fails, such as due to a stream of revenue that simply is insufficient to 
repay loans, especially high-cost fringe loans.  If defaults are likely to 
occur, and perhaps even to be exacerbated by fringe lending, then it 
could be argued that the franchisees’ use of fringe loans should be 
limited or monitored to ensure repayment.  The cost of such monitoring 
should not be much, as an assessment of repayment ability should be 
undertaken, anyway, by the franchisee and franchisor in consultation 
with one another.  The franchise relationship itself could provide 
protection for franchisees, with less need for governmental oversight of 
financing arrangements.188  For instance, a franchisor usually should 
 
business for at least five years and has a net worth of at least $5,424,500” is exempt from the 
disclosure requirements under the Rule.  16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(5)(ii) (2007). 
 185.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 31106 (West 2009) (defining “experienced franchisees” and applying 
that definition to the initial sale of a franchise to sophisticated buyers). 
 186.  See supra notes 167 &174-174 and accompanying text. 
 187.  All franchises can be summarized as contractual relationships between a franchisor and 
franchisee.  This business relationship is distinguishable from consumer contracts that receive 
stricter review by the courts in favor of the consumer.  Surely all franchisees understand that they 
are opening a business and will be taking some sort of risk.  The requirements to be a franchisee are 
too variable to sum up into basic requirements.  A vague statement can be made asserting that 
usually a franchisee must be sophisticated enough to satisfy each individual franchisor’s specific 
requirements, but more research would be needed to support a more specific statement.  See infra 
note 207 and accompanying text. 
 188.  Needleman, supra note 112.  But see OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INSPECTION & 
EVALUATION DIV., (U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.), SBA’S EXPERIENCE WITH DEFAULTED FRANCHISE 
LOANS 2 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Inspector General Report], available at  
http://archive.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba/oig_bllo_2-27.pdf (commenting on the 
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have fixed contractual duties to ensure that prospective franchisees meet 
the minimum standards for success.189  These duties should include, in 
general, dealing with franchisees in good faith, as well as, more 
specifically, providing franchisees with supervision, training, know-how, 
and various acts of periodic assistance.190  As for the standards, they 
might include, for example, balance sheet targets, solvency or profit 
requirements, and market-share goals.  The franchisor’s duties would be 
aimed at apportioning responsibilities fairly between the franchisor and 
franchisee as they jointly seek to achieve their ambitions for the 
franchising network. 
There are also good consumer guide resources that may help 
potential franchisees focus on important aspects of the franchise 
relationship, and thereby reduce the need for governmental oversight.191  
These consumer guides provide comprehensive information regarding 
the benefits and responsibilities of potential franchisees, including the 
common sense suggestion that a franchisee engage in due diligence and 
research her prospective franchisor.192  Additionally, franchisors can 
impose on potential franchisees higher requirements, such as a larger 
initial down payment.193  Assuming that more franchisors follow this 
model and expect more—financial or otherwise—from their franchisees, 
the franchisee is encouraged to take more self-protective measures, as 
she has more at stake (more sunk costs in time and money).  
Furthermore, the franchisee also may get more financial oversight 
because she may choose to bring in outside lenders, such as fringe 
banking, to meet her rising costs. 
With extensive regulation and policing of fringe markets on the 
horizon as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act,194 the impact on small 
 
incentive franchisors have to collect franchising fees by embellishing a franchisee’s financial 
projections to help underqualified franchisee’s obtain SBA loans). 
 189.  See AM. ASSOC. OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS, FAIR FRANCHISING STANDARDS 38 
(1996-2012), available at http://www.aafd.org/images/pdf/AAFD-Fair-Franchising-Standards.pdf 
[hereinafter AAFD Fair Franchising Standards]. 
 190.  Id. at 37-38. 
 191.  See Buying a Franchise: A Consumer Guide, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, 
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/inv05-buying-franchise-consumer-guide (last visited Dec. 14, 
2012). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Emily Maltby, Want to Buy a Franchise? The Requirements Went Up, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
15, 2010, 4:45 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704361504575552803956439716.html (discussing some franchisor 
requirements including good personal financials, strong industry experience, and a higher initial 
down payment). 
 194.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
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businesses must be considered.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has 
stated that businesses’ use of these high-cost loans is a reason to oppose 
regulation.195  According to a bulletin published by the Federal Reserve 
in 2006, small businesses, which include nonfarm entities with 500 or 
fewer employees, created sixty to eighty percent of net new jobs 
annually over the previous decade.196  With such a significant role to 
play, the CFPB must be careful not to impede the ability of small 
businesses to obtain all the credit they need.197  Moreover, in the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, the presence of an outsider—a third-
party lender—can help, immeasurably, the franchisee, particularly 
inasmuch as the lender requires some comprehensive analysis of a 
franchise’s prospects.  In turn, the lender is engaged in its own review of 
the franchise purchase.  The franchisor’s role in helping the franchisee, 
therefore, suggests that less regulation of fringe lenders is needed 
because the franchisor itself can create a safety buffer, helping the 
franchisee to make an informed decision and thereby reducing the risks 
the franchisee may incur with respect to fringe lending.198 
To understand further why the franchisee’s enlisting of financial 
support can be aligned with whatever franchisor support the franchisee 
receives, and thus removed from consumer lending protections, consider 
what the principal federal regulator of franchising has concluded.  The 
FTC discussed why the franchisor’s lending of money to the franchisee 
is not counted toward the monetary amount ($1 million) for someone to 
be a “sophisticated” franchisee to whom a franchisor need not meet the 
FTC Rule disclosure requirements.199  While money from other sources 
 
Stat. 1376-2223 (2010), discussed supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text, and supra note 128. 
 195.  Durkin, supra note 73, at 2-3. 
 196.  Traci L. Mach & John D. Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: 
Evidence from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, 92 FED. RES. BULL. 167, 167 (2006). 
 197.  It is important to note that, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB is empowered to 
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products and services.”  12 U.S.C.A. § 
5491(a).  The Act defines “consumer” as an individual or someone acting on behalf of an 
individual.  12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(4).  Although the Act does not specifically define individual, it 
does, however, limit consumer financial products or services to those “offered or provided for use 
by consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”  12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(5)(A); 
see also Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23, 25-
26 (2011) (discussing the powers of the CFPB).  As such, if the CFPB begins limiting fringe 
consumer credit, it will also likely, as a result, limit business credit because consumers make up the 
majority of revenue for fringe lenders.  That is, unless those fringe lenders can make up this lost 
revenue, they probably will eventually fail and will no longer be an option for consumers or 
businesses. 
 198.  Pattison, supra note 169. 
 199.  Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 
15,520 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37) (2009) [hereinafter, FTC Disclosure 
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(besides the franchisor itself) do count, the FTC proclaimed the value of 
introducing another experienced, independent party, the outside lender, 
into the situation: 
[I]t is reasonable to assume that a lender, in order to minimize its own 
financial risk, will ensure that a prospective franchisee will conduct a 
due diligence investigation of the franchise offering.  Indeed, by 
involving a lender, the prospective franchisee effectively ensures that 
there is an independent, sophisticated entity inserted into the sales 
process.  This additional safeguard would be lost if sources of 
financing for purposes of the exemption included the franchisor and its 
affiliates.200 
In effect, the presence of the lender may ensure more protection for 
the franchisee in evaluating her franchise investment, and the 
franchisor’s involvement may help protect the franchisee from entering 
into an unnecessary, overreaching arrangement.  The presence of a third 
party (the lender, for the franchise relationship; and the franchisor, for 
the loan) may be leveraged to help the franchisee.  It is win-win, at least 
for the franchisee involving both his franchise and his loan.201 
The franchisor looks after the franchisee and its arrangements with 
third-party financiers, if for no other reason than it is in the franchisor’s 
best interest to do so202— ensuring that the franchisee is not so 
financially strapped so as to hurt the franchisor’s chances for success.203  
 
Requirements and Prohibition]. 
 200.  Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 
15,525 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37) (2009) [hereinafter, FTC Disclosure 
Requirements and Prohibition]. 
 201.  It may also be a win-win for franchisors that have better financed franchisees.  See infra, 
Part IV, B. 
 202.  In some other areas of the franchise relationship, one could argue that any franchisee 
“protection” provided by the franchisor might be suspect.  Some issues involved in franchising—the 
parties’ disproportionate bargaining power, the uninformed approach of many franchisees, and 
matters of contract language, territoriality, and independent contractor status—raise concerns for 
which the franchisor’s interests may diverge from the franchisee.  See generally Emerson, 
Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 150; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 
AM. BUS. L.J. 191 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees Without Counsel: Presumed Competent 
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise 
Independence: Awaiting Public Recognition (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); 
Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 181. 
However, in the restricted area of business finance, the franchisor’s and the franchisee’s interests 
coincide.  Indeed, franchisors ordinarily have strong incentives to have franchisees with sufficient 
financing. 
 203.  See infra note 231 and accompanying text (concerning the alignment of franchisor and 
franchisee interests for franchise financing); cf. infra note 232 and accompanying text (noting how 
many aspects of the franchise relationship other than financing involve varying, indeed often 
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That in turn probably makes it less important that the government 
protect the franchisee from fringe banking fiascos, because the 
franchisor should assist in that regard.204  Even if there are rules intended 
to protect the franchisee, the FTC’s limited resources make pursuit of a 
rule-breaker both rare and, when undertaken, quite likely to be settled.  
Franchisees have no cause of action under the Franchise Rule, and they 
usually have little hope of successfully challenging franchisor conduct by 
filing suits under the “Little FTC” state laws modeled after the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.205  That result is because these laws tend to be 
rather narrowly drafted, and they have been construed so as not to permit 
private actions for claims constituting simply a breach of contract.206 
The proposal to depend on franchisor-franchisee oversight of any 
outside lending, and thereby to be distinct from consumer finance 
regulation, comports with case law.  Most courts facing this issue have 
held that a franchisee is not a consumer for purposes of his franchise 
contract.207  As pro-franchisee attorneys have long lamented, “[t]he most 
frequent barrier to franchisee redress . . . is that a franchisee may not be 
‘consumer’ and/or the specific issue being litigated may not be a 
‘consumer transaction.’”208  This outcome is especially troubling in that 
 
directly competing, interests). 
 204.  If franchisees are more informed, they may not need as much protection via regulation, 
similar to an “accredited investor” not needing as much securities law protection.  See Net Worth 
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No.33-9287, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
89,666 (Mar. 23, 2012).  But see Inspector General Report, supra note 188, at 2 (discussing the 
incentive that franchisors have to gain as many franchisees as possible in order to obtain royalties 
and other fees). 
 205.  See Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise 
Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 280 (2004) (discussing the “little FTC Acts” of various 
states); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (2010).  Many states permit franchisees to seek recovery from 
franchisors under state “little” FTC Acts.  Bailey Emp’t Sys., Inc. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62, 72 (D. 
Conn. 1982), aff’d without opinion, 723 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 206.  Bailey Emp’t Sys. Inc., 545 F. Supp. at 72. 
 207.  See, e.g., J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal. Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1272-
73 (3d Cir. 1994); Meineke Disc. Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Delta 
Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 975 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1992); West Coast Franchising Co. v. 
WCV Corp., 30 F.Supp.2d 498, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, 
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1061-64 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1365, 
1387-88 (D. Haw. 1995); Sparks Tune-Up Ctrs. Inc. v. Addison, Civ. No. 89-1355, 1989 WL 
73631, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1989); Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368, 
371 (D. Md. 1989); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Whiteman Tire, Inc., 935 P.2d 628, 744-745 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).  As noted in BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 80, at 275, the franchisee is 
ordinarily in a position that is as close to the “ultimate” businessperson (the franchisor) than it is to 
the actual consumer: “[g]enerally, the courts recognize that the franchisee is a ‘middleman’ between 
the franchisor and the ultimate customer.” 
 208.  Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 205, at 280. 
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the popular culture, the language used in advertising, and no doubt the 
franchisee’s own cognitive biases all point to an emotional conclusion 
that the franchisee is really a type of partner with the franchisor as well 
as a consumer of the franchisor’s business network and method of doing 
business.209 
Occasionally a court will observe that the franchisor-franchisee 
affiliation has the attributes of a consumer relationship, with the 
franchisee (the consumer) subject to an adhesion contract: 
Although franchise agreements are commercial contracts they exhibit 
many of the attributes of consumer contracts.  The relationship 
between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing, 
although not universal, inequality of economic resources between the 
contracting parties.  Franchisees typically, but not always, are small 
businessmen or businesswomen . . . seeking to make the transition 
from being wage earners and for whom the franchise is their very first 
business.  Franchisors typically, but not always, are large corporations. 
The agreements themselves tend to reflect this gross bargaining 
disparity.  Usually they are form contracts the franchisor prepared and 
offered to franchisees on a take it or leave it basis.  Among other 
typical terms, these agreements often allow the franchisor to terminate 
the agreement or refuse to renew for virtually any reason, including the 
desire to give a franchisor-owned outlet the prime territory the 
franchisee presently occupies.210 
Moreover, while most courts hold that the franchisee is not a 
consumer, nor does its transaction with the franchisor constitute a 
consumer deal, there are several state unfair trade practices statutes 
(Little FTC Acts) under which the franchisee has been found to be a 
consumer.211  The approach under foreign law produces this same result, 
with most holding that franchisees are not consumers, hence not 
 
 209.  Id. at 146, 155. 
 210.  Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 211.  See Scotsman Group, Inc. v. Mid-America Distrib., Inc., No. 93 C 7320, 1994 WL 
118458, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 1994); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 850 (D. Minn. 
1989); Luzim v. Phillips, No. 87 C 112, 1987 WL 30214, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1987) (applying 
Florida law); Kavky v. Herbalife Int’l of Am., 820 A.2d 677, 678 (N.J. Super. 2003); ATS Se., Inc. 
v. Carrier Corp., 18 S.W.3d 626, 626-27 (Tenn. 2000); Nelson v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 762 
S.W.2d 744, 746–47 (Tex. Ct. App. San Antonio 1988).  But see J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal. 
Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994); C-B Kenworth, Inc. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957 (D. Me. 1988); Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 
368, 371 (D. Md. 1989); Roberts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 643 A.2d 956, 960 (N.H. 1994).  For a 
discussion of numerous states’ Little FTC Acts, see GARNER, supra note 152, at §§9:34–9:36. 
37
Emerson: Franchisees in a Fringe Banking World
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  4:49 PM 
38 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:01 
protected, but with a sizeable minority holding otherwise.212 
Although the franchisee needs protection in many other areas,213 it 
seems that the franchisee does not need the protections that come with 
being a consumer, at least not to the extent non-franchised, independent 
business owners and individuals may need protection.  Moreover, the 
franchisee, not when compared to the franchisor but when matched up to 
others under the Dodd-Frank Act, may be considered relatively 
sophisticated.  As long as there is: (1) a franchise agreement or manual 
specifying procedures for and limitations on the financing 
arrangements,214 and (2) an ongoing  “relational” contract between 
franchisor and franchisee215 in which the franchisor can monitor the 
franchisee’s financial choices, then the franchisee truly is not on her 
own.216  Therefore, she need not receive the same measure of protection 
that is extended to individuals or other, independent small businesses 
under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
With its limited resources, the CFPB must be encouraged to focus 
on those borrowers—ordinary consumers and the small, non-networked, 
truly independent businesspersons—who need a regulatory framework.  
Despite franchisees’ having a network of private support (their franchise 
system) and often a franchisee support system,217 franchisees can 
 
 212.  INT’L BAR ASS’N, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: FRANCHISE 18, 26, 31, 43, 52, 57, 64, 
70, 76, 80, 87-88, 94, 102, 109, 117, 124, 129 143 150, 156, 165, 172, 179, 184, 190, 196, 201 & 217 
(2012) (franchisees are protected consumers—Austria (sometimes), El Salvador, Germany (if 
obliged to purchase goods on a recurrent basis), Guatemala, Italy (sometimes), Japan (sometimes), 
Kuwait (sometimes), Mexico, South Africa, Sweden (sometimes), Thailand; franchisees are not—
Canada, China, Finland, France (very unlikely), India, Indonesia, Netherlands (rarely), New 
Zealand (rarely), Romania, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
(very unlikely), and Venezuela). 
 213.  Supra notes 202, 208-209 and accompanying text. 
 214.  Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 150, at 973-75 (noting that only 10% 
of the franchise contracts had provisions in which the franchisor provides assistance to the 
franchisee in obtaining financing); Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra note 150 
(noting that the percentage of franchise contracts with a financing-assistance provision had risen to 
12%). 
 215.  Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928 (1990). 
 216.  Indeed, it is clear that reputable franchisors often act to keep would-be franchisees from 
getting their funding outside of the usual business lending circles. 
 217.  On a national level, there are pro-franchisee groups, e.g., the American Association of 
Franchisees and Dealers (AAFD); also, among just the franchisees for that network, often are 
independent franchisee associations that could look after members’ interests.  See Robert W. 
Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1505-06 
(1990); Stan Turkel, Independent Franchisee Associations Grow, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Nov. 7, 
2011, 8:12 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/independentfranchisee_associations_infas_rise 
(reporting that the number of independent associations of franchisees—presently between 300 and 
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succumb to the temptations of costly, ill-considered fringe loans; that 
should make all the clearer to policymakers the need to protect the others 
(consumers and nonfranchised small businesses) who use fringe banking 
products.  Indeed, perhaps the most vulnerable users of fringe banking 
are those who really are on their own while running a business and, 
therefore, as evidence may indicate, deserve the Dodd-Frank Act 
protections even more than an individual consumer would.218 
E. Sophistication: Finding Middle Ground Between Consumer Needs 
and Business Growth 
It is a challenge: striking the appropriate balance between 
protecting consumers from egregious, extortionist financial practices and 
allowing individuals as well as businesses to retain their ability to obtain 
high-cost lending by choice.  One key to accomplishing both goals is a 
heavy disclosure regime, but a light set of substantive regulations. 
Fringe providers could be required to disclose all information 
related to their lending in a clear, concise, easy-to-understand format.219  
This disclosure would likely need to take place in a more detailed 
manner, something beyond a simple written document, beyond the pro 
forma requirements of Item 10 in the Franchise Disclosure Document.220  
For many borrowers, it would be advantageous for a lender to discuss 
the fees, interest rates, and loan terms orally as well as in writing to 
ensure the individual is fully aware of his obligations.  If the lender 
comprehensively discloses the negative aspects of a loan, the borrower 
should retain the right to accept or decline.  In an emergency situation, a 
borrower may rationally decide to accept the terms of a high-cost loan 
despite the drawbacks.221 
Another possible method to ease the burden on franchisees seeking 
access to credit would be legislative reform.222  Just like for consumer 
 
400—is growing, and that franchisee associations recently have won several legal battles over 
matters such as standing, use of advertising funds, and damages). 
 218.  To give an example of how increased connections to lending activity does not necessarily 
produce better loans or practices, and debtors can still be driven out of business, see Inspector 
General Report, supra note 188, at 13–20 (providing many examples of how the lending process 
through the SBA did not stave off business failure and may, in fact, have helped to cause it). 
 219.  See Inspector General Report, supra note 188, at 5-6 (providing as a practical 
recommendation, for lenders to clearly define what a franchise loan is, and what its general terms 
are). 
 220. 16 C.F.R. 436.5(j).  For a proposed disclosure rule concerning a franchisor’s obligation to 
disclose fringe financing related information, see infra Part IV. 
 221.  Supra notes 15, 30–52 and accompanying text, concerning payday loans. 
 222.  Franchisees Push Capitol Hill for Help, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG. (Sept. 19, 2011, 9:33 PM), 
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lending, business borrowers should be as informed as possible about the 
terms upon which each financing is offered.  With these increased 
disclosures, both business borrowers and fringe lenders could slow 
down, investigate each other, and fully discuss the terms of loans; the 
borrowers thereby would be better able to exercise choices about 
financing.223 
 On the contrary, if regulation is strict to the point that fringe 
lenders cannot remain profitable, individuals and businesses will lose 
access to funds.224  While consumers should be protected from lenders 
that provide false or misleading information, these consumers should be 
permitted to make financial decisions for themselves based on their 
personal assessment of the costs and benefits.225  Statistics indicate the 
demographics of individual, nonbusiness fringe borrowers swing 
strongly toward the poor and the less educated, i.e., people who may not 
comprehend the magnitude, let alone the specifics, of their loan 
obligations even when there are stronger, more comprehensive warnings 
and perhaps spot “checkups” by the authorities.226  It is clear that 
regulation would be useful to protect these borrowers from themselves.  
However, it is nearly impossible to regulate the borrowing activity of 
these individuals, but not that of the business owners and their families 
that understand a transaction and freely accept it despite the negative 
terms.  A fringe lender cannot size up an individual based on her 
demographic characteristics and simply withhold loans from those 
persons that appear less experienced or intelligent.  Franchising rules, 
along those lines, have included bright-line standards concerning when 
the more dependent party (the franchisee) may not need the usual 
 
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10689/franchise_group_pushes_cantor_fdic_help (discussing the 
initiative franchisees are taking to ensure better access to credit and tax reform).  Additionally, using 
usury ceilings to limit the amount of interest a fringe lender can charge may also help protect 
consumers who use these services.  Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 663–64 (discussing a 
possible solution in using usury ceilings to help protect consumers). 
 223.  See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text. 
 224.  See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 225.  A consumer’s personal assessment, however, is still not without its risks.  Research 
shows that consumers chronically underestimate financial risks and are overconfident about their 
future circumstances; they become, in some cases, “hopelessly optimistic” in regard to paying back 
a loan.  See generally, Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lending”—A Proposal for 
Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 912-13 (2012). 
 226.  See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.  For example, via periodic, random checks 
of posted online information and also of the interactions between lenders’ representatives and 
customers, the latter portrayed by a fair lending tester comparable to a fair housing tester or perhaps 
a secret shopper. 
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protections.227 
Even with standards that say an applicant franchisee, to be 
“sophisticated,” must have invested at least a million dollars, which can 
be her own savings or money, which she borrowed from anyone but the 
franchisor itself, there are unresolved issues.  Perhaps this one-million-
dollars-plus threshold simply raises more questions about individual 
circumstances, especially the source of the prospective franchisee’s 
funds: “Did she re-mortgage her residence?  Did he borrow from a friend 
or relative?  Did they cash in their retirement fund?  [Also,] what other 
assets, liabilities, and income [does] the prospective franchisee ha[ve] 
from which one can estimate his or her financial sophistication and 
tolerance of risk[?]”228  Indeed, it has been suggested that, from a 
lender’s perspective, a franchisee can fall into one of two categories: 
individuals with previous business experience, and individuals with little 
experience who are trying to start up a franchise.229  The former will be 
deemed “sophisticated” due to their business experience, while the latter 
will have a much harder time obtaining traditional financing because 
they are seen as high-risk.230 
There is insufficient evidence that it would be beneficial to impose 
the Dodd-Frank Act protections upon franchisees as if they were 
consumers.  In financing, franchisor and franchisee interests tend to 
align, and so franchisees can benefit from the knowledge and assistance 
 
 227.  Indeed, in franchising, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long refrained from 
adopting a standard that would require franchisors to evaluate the experience and knowledge of 
potential franchisees.  Instead, the Commission, in amending its Franchise Rule (promulgated in 
1978, amended in 2007), stuck with three precise monetary figures establishing which would-be 
franchisees do not need to be furnished the information normally required under the Rule: 
16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(5)(i) (2010) (the “large investment” exemption)—franchise sales where the 
prospective franchisee makes an initial investment totaling at least $1 million, excluding the cost of 
unimproved land and franchisor financing; 
16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(5)(ii) (2010) (the “large franchisee” exemption)—franchise sale to ongoing 
entities, such as airports, hospitals, and universities, with at least $5 million net worth and five years 
of prior business experience; 
16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(6) (2010) (the “insiders” exemption)—franchise sales to the owners, directors, 
and managers of an entity before it becomes a franchisor. 
 228.  Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions, supra note 200, at 15, 522–23 (Mar. 30, 2007) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37) (2009) (comments of franchisee attorney Eric Karp). 
 229.  Niles Howard, Getting Lenders to Provide Franchise Financing, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 
16, 2004), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/73860. 
 230.  Id.  However, the SBA’s experience with lending to franchisees suggests that franchisees 
were defaulting at high rates because of the lending banks’ inability to get credible information; 
most franchisees were new and had no business history with that particular brand.  See supra notes 
155, 170-172, 176 and accompanying text (concerning the comparatively higher failure rate for 
SBA-backed loans extended to franchisees). 
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of the franchisor.231  This is a distinct advantage over other aspects of the 
franchise relationship, where the franchisor and franchisee naturally 
have varying, if not directly competing interests.  Examples of such 
issues are encroachment, antitrust law, terminations, and non-compete 
covenants.232  Likewise, one could say that any problem in fringe 
banking, at least for a successful business, may be no worse than other 
financial issues businesses face, such as for matters of real estate and 
credit cards. 
 
V. A PROPOSED DISCLOSURE RULE: FITTING THE ARGUMENT FOR 
DISCLOSURE OF FRINGE FINANCING INFORMATION INTO THE EXISTING 
MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT 
A. The Materiality Requirement 
The amended FTC Franchise Rule233 provides that franchisors may 
not “alter unilaterally and materially the terms and conditions of the 
basic franchise agreement or any related agreements attached to the 
disclosure document without furnishing the prospective franchisee with 
a copy of each revised agreement at least seven calendar-days before the 
prospective franchisee signs the revised agreement.”234  More generally, 
though, beyond just the franchise agreement, the rule requires 
franchisors to disclose all material information to prospective 
franchisees.235  The number and scope of items that may be material is 
 
 231.  Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 150, at 942 (arguing that franchise 
financing is often an area of franchisee dependence on the greater experience and knowledge of the 
franchisor, who is better suited to either furnish funding for the franchisee or obtain excellent 
financing through the franchisor’s contacts); Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra 
note 150 (noting how franchisors’ and franchisees’ interests can be aligned concerning arranging the 
funding to start a franchise). 
 232.  Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A French Comparison, 3 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 315, 339-41 (2009); Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, supra note 
202; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make it Better, 46 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 349 (2013); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Termination: Legal Rights and Practical 
Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 564-70 
(1998); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 779, 779-80 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and Consumers’ Beliefs About “Tied” 
Products: The Death Knell for Krehl?, 45 FLA. L. REV. 163, 165-73 (1993); Robert W. Emerson, 
Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1049, 1053-93 (1995). 
 233.  Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 C.F.R. § 436 
(2007). 
 234.  16 C.F.R. § 436.2(b) (2010). 
  235.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, FRANCHISE RULE COMPLIANCE GUIDE ii (2008), available at 
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substantial.  Indeed, the FTC “considers every required disclosure in a 
disclosure document to be material.”236 
Although materiality is thus crucial, the amended FTC Franchise 
Rule does not define the term “material” because the FTC considers its 
jurisprudence, particularly that concerning violations of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act,237 to be sufficient guidance.238  For franchise matters, the FTC 
has decided, materiality can be determined by “the reasonable 
prospective franchisee standard.”239  Regulators and courts alike apply 
an objective test of what a reasonable person would consider important 
in deciding to purchase a franchise.240 
The amended rule does outline certain required disclosures the 
franchisor must make to the franchisee.  These disclosures include, inter 
alia, the franchisor’s business experience, its litigation or bankruptcy 
history, information relating to fees and initial investment, restrictions 
on products, the franchisee’s obligations, and financing.241  Within the 
finance related disclosures, the franchisor must disclose the terms of the 
financing agreement, including what the financing covers, the interest 
rate, the payment period, and the number of payments, among other 
 
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/franchise-rule-compliance-guide (stating, “Like the original 
Franchise Rule and the UFOC Guidelines, the amended Rule requires franchisors to give 
prospective franchisees material information, including background information on the franchisor, 
the costs of entering into the business, the legal obligations of the franchisor and the franchisee, 
statistics on franchised and company-owned outlets, and audited financial information.”). 
 236.  Joseph Y. Adler & Michael R. Laidhold, Assessing Materiality in Franchise Disclosure 
Documents: A Canada-U.S. Analysis, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 245, 248 (2011). 
 237.  15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012).  The definition of “material” used by the FTC has also been 
built upon the definition used in federal securities law: whether the misstatement or omission 
“might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of 
deciding how to vote.”  Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); see also TSC 
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality under a “substantial 
likelihood” test—a substantial likelihood that (1) “under all the circumstances, the omitted fact 
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder,” or, to 
phrase it differently, that (2) “the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”). 
 238.  Federal Trade Commission: Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning 
Franchising and Business Opportunities; Final Rule, 1 72 Fed. Reg. 15444, 15455-56 (Mar. 30, 
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/R511003FranchiseRuleFRNotice.pdf. 
 239.  Id. at 15455.  In this sense, the FTC still follows the materiality standard expressly stated 
in the original FTC Franchise Rule, promulgated in 1978: materiality is “any fact, circumstance, or 
set of conditions which has a substantial likelihood of influencing a reasonable franchisee or a 
reasonable prospective franchisee in the making of a significant decision relating to a named 
franchise business or which has any significant financial impact on a franchisee or prospective 
franchisee.” 16 C.F.R. §436.2(n) (2004) (repealed by the amended FTC Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. 
§436 (2007)). 
 240.  See Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1432 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 241.  16 C.F.R. 436.5(g)(7)(ii). 
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items.242  In addition to these items, the franchisor must disclose any 
additional material financing terms.243 
B. Mutual Benefits of Disclosure 
The franchisee typically is linked with a larger, more experienced 
business, the franchisor, that bargains on behalf of the franchisee and 
offers better incentives244 to traditional lenders than an independent 
business could offer.245  Often the franchisor has existing credit 
relationships with traditional banking institutions that the franchisee 
could utilize.246  That fact may be especially important as franchisees—
who typically have used their own credit resources (e.g., credit cards) 
more than those of traditional lenders such as banks—face more 
restricted and less available credit for personal lines of credit.  Although 
sometimes the interests of the franchisee and franchisor will be at odds, 
it is in the interest of both parties that the franchise succeeds.247 
This franchisor-franchisee mutuality of interest is a result of the 
business relationship, not of law.248  The FTC Rule’s mandated 
disclosure about financing only applies when there is a financing 
“arrangement” between the franchisor and the franchisee.249  If the 
franchisee obtains outside financing, there are no financing related items 
to disclose.  For most franchisees, that effectively means no financing 
disclosures need be provided.  Relatively few franchisees obtain 
 
 242.  16 C.F.R. 436.5(j). 
 243.  16 C.F.R. 436.5(j)(1)(x). 
 244.  E.g., guarantees. 
 245.  In fact, given the tight credit situation, franchisors may have to provide franchisees with 
more financing options.  Cecilia M. Falbe, Ajith Kumar & Dianne H.B. Welsh, Franchisee Use Of 
Bootstrapping: An Exploratory Study Of Financing Decisions, 7 SMALL BUS. INST. J. 63, 67-68 
(Oct. 2011) (finding that new franchisees relied on their own credit and personal loans to finance 
their business; further noting that with the tightening of credit by credit card companies many 
potential franchisees will be locked out of a typical source for business startup funds). 
 246.  See Darrell Johnson, Thank the Banks! (What?): Banks are Helping Franchising Win the 
Competition For Credit, FRANCHISE UPDATE, http://www.franchising.com/articles/
thank_the_banks_what_banks_are_helping_franchising_win_the_competition_for_.html (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2012); Kermit Pattison, Tight Credit Is Turning Franchisers Into Lenders, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/business/smallbusiness/10sbiz.html. 
 247.  See supra notes 202, 231, and accompanying text. 
 248.  If it has a legal origin in addition to simple business or economic self-interest, the ties 
between the franchisor and franchisee arise most fundamentally through the contract that they have 
reached. 
 249.  16 C.F.R. 436.5(j)(1) (the franchisor must “[d]isclose the terms of each financing 
arrangement. including leases and installment contracts, that the franchisor, its agent, or affiliates 
offer directly or indirectly to the franchisee.”). 
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financing directly from the franchisor,250 and, indeed, the franchise 
relationship probably does offer the franchisee more avenues of 
obtaining credit than what may be available to an independent 
business.251  Franchisees seem to be better protected by their 
relationships with their franchisors as compared with independent 
businesses, which likely have fewer champions or larger entities vested 
in their success. 
A thorough disclosure of financing possibilities may increase the 
franchisee’s likelihood of success, which benefits the franchisor as well 
in the form of a steady income stream (i.e., royalties, fees, network 
expansion and the resulting initial payments for new franchises).  A 
successful franchisee supports the sustenance and growth of her 
franchisor’s operations and in turn prevents the franchisor from 
incurring the costs of finding, training, and starting a new franchise to 
replace a failed franchisee.  Given the presence of the FTC’s disclosure 
requirement,252 it is hardly a burdensome step to require the franchisor to 
provide disclosures relating to financing needs that might arise in the 
future, including information on the risks and benefits of obtaining 
financing from fringe sources.  If franchisors disclose information about 
fringe banking and the potential that a franchisee may need to turn to 
fringe banking in the course of its business, the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship is strengthened.253  The franchisee is made aware of the 
potential need for and risk involved in fringe banking, and the franchisor 
protects itself from any potential future recourse in the form of 
disclosure.  Moreover, with greater protection in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship, regulators are free to create and enact legislation 
that protects the true “consumers,” i.e., individuals, while still allowing 
for a more deregulated environment with lower transaction costs in 
relation to small business debtors who have an added degree of 
sophistication arising out of the disclosure from franchisors. 
Extrapolating on the definition of materiality in the franchise 
setting,254 there is already an argument to be made that types of available 
financing are material and should be disclosed to a franchisee.  In 
Barnes v. Burger King Corp.,255 the court defined materiality in the 
franchise setting as judged by an objective standard, a statutory or 
 
 250.  See supra note 214. 
 251.  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 252.  16 C.F.R. 436.5(j). 
 253.  Supra notes 202, 231, and accompanying text. 
 254.  See supra notes 235-240 and accompanying text. 
 255.  932 F. Supp. 1420, 1432 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
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regulatory approach beyond the common law’s almost cavalier, laissez-
faire perspective.  The Florida statute interpreted in Barnes is similar to 
the FTC Rule and to many state rules or statutes in that it requires 
franchisor to do more than not commit common law fraud, but instructs 
franchisors that they must “disclose efforts to sell or establish more 
franchises or distributorships than is reasonable to expect the market or 
market area for the particular franchise or distributorship to sustain.”256  
While the common law cases on fraud narrow the mandatory disclosures 
to “facts material to the contract at issue” and bar from consideration 
“mere possibilities and facts that the defendant may not think are 
relevant,” the franchise law “broadens the scope of information which 
must be disclosed to include efforts to sell or establish more franchises 
and imposes an objective standard of relevancy.”257 
Under the proposed expansive definition of materiality, potential 
franchisees could mull over information related to outside types of 
financing.  For a franchisee who needs financing quickly, traditional 
financing forms may not be available, and, depending on why the 
franchisee needs financing, the franchisee may not qualify for traditional 
financing.  This, it turns out, is a very real problem.258  Faced with this 
situation, one alternative for the potential franchisee may be fringe 
financing.  When a potential franchisee is considering what is important 
in deciding to purchase a business, financing information—how the 
franchisee will fund his business—is vital. If information relating to 
fringe financing were disclosed by the franchisor, the franchisee would 
not only be making a more informed purchase when it acquires a 
franchise, the franchisee would also be more prepared when a situation 
entailing the need for fringe financing arises. 
In summary, the benefits of a disclosure are threefold.  Disclosing 
information related to fringe financing protects the franchisee, it benefits 
the franchisor, and it gives regulators the freedom to promulgate rules 
 
 256.  FLA. STAT. § 817.416(2)(a)(3) (2011).  Another prohibited failure to disclose, which is 
far beyond common law restrictions, is to not tell a prospective franchisee “the known required total 
investment” for a franchise.  Id. at § 817.416(2)(a)(2). 
 257.  Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1432 (S.D. Fla. 1986).  Florida law, for 
example, forbids franchisors from misrepresenting not just established facts (e.g., something in the 
past—actual results), but also “the prospects or chances for success of a proposed or existing 
franchise.”  FLA. STAT. § 817.416(2)(a)(1)(2011). 
 258.  The marketing director for V2K window décor & more, Paul Linenberg, reported, “[w]e 
were finding that people otherwise qualified can’t get financing through traditional methods,” that 
“[d]emand is still out there, but the availability of credit is thin.”  Jonathan Maze, Tight Credit Is 
Turning Franchisors into Lenders, FRANCHISE TIMES, Apr. 2009, available at 
http://www.franchisetimes.com/April-2009/Tight-credit-is-turning-franchisors-into-lenders/. 
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that focus on true consumers of these services, the individual, without 
raising transaction costs and administrative hurdles for small business 
debtors that need to obtain financing from fringe services. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regulation of fringe lenders will likely prove a more difficult 
challenge than many anticipate.  Most would agree that consumer 
protection laws will prove useful in a market where the engagement in, 
and continuing potential for, egregious practices is substantial.  Still, the 
CFPB must find a way to balance its regulations with the maintenance of 
individual autonomy in financial decision-making and the grant of 
greater access to funds for the unbanked and those with poor credit.  
This balance should be contemplated with competing private interests in 
mind, namely the need for individual consumer protection from 
potentially predatory practices, and the unfettered access to a stream of 
financial support for small business debtors.  The need for balance is 
especially clear when one gazes outside the tent of the usual “consumer” 
and instead looks at small business debtors, such as franchisees. 
Perhaps this balance can be achieved by regulating individual 
consumer use more heavily, while applying fewer or lighter regulations 
for small business debtors.  The idea would be to clarify that increased 
protections for debtors would only extend to completely consumer-
oriented loans.  Federal bank examiners might push for a slightly lower 
level of high-risk consumer borrowers in lender loan portfolios.  This 
requirement likely would increase the need for banks to investigate fully 
the potential consumer-borrowers before lending them funds.  Although 
that could tighten credit, at least marginally and comparatively, for a 
small percentage of consumers, it would have the reverse effect on small 
business, as the lenders can go with a lower level of “due diligence” in 
determining whether to lend to franchisees. 
While there is a risk that potential franchisees may not be as 
sophisticated as their peers (other applicants or actual franchisees) and 
therefore may not be afforded as much protection, that is an inherent risk 
which an individual must take in pursuit of building a business.  This 
two-tiered approach (CFPB regulations for consumers, and perhaps for 
nonfranchised, independent, small business owners; but merely 
franchisor disclosures to franchisees) may be the best way to balance the 
obvious need for individual consumer protection from predatory 
practices, while at the same time not stifling an important stream of 
revenue for small business debtors.  Indeed, for franchisors and 
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franchisees to focus only on disclosures may hone their attention on 
what matters most—the franchise network.  Disclosing such information 
is even in the franchisor’s best interest, as the disclosures increase the 
level of sophistication of the franchisee, and will inform the franchisee 
on how to make better business decisions. Armed with this information, 
the franchisee will be more acutely aware of risks when seeking 
financing from a fringe lender. 
Franchisees should not be treated as “consumers” subject to strict 
regulations, while non-business individuals, genuine consumers, should 
be afforded this greater oversight and protection because they lack the 
support of the franchise model.  However, in order for this 
comparatively “hands off” approach to regulation to take hold, lenders 
and franchisors should both be proactive in terms of ascertaining the 
total amount, and the purposes behind, all financing that a franchisee 
obtains.  For lenders not to be subject to special, consumer-oriented 
protections, they need to have obtained disclosures from the business 
debtor indicating her particular, non-consumer use of the money - that it 
is to help pay some of the upfront costs in becoming a franchisee of the 
X Corporation, with that disclosure also forwarded to the X Corporation 
itself.  Moreover, there should be an affirmative declaration that the 
franchisee has consulted with the franchisor about her various financing 
options, including, specifically, the use of lenders other than traditional 
banks.  So long as the franchisor is informed as to what the franchisee is 
doing, then franchisee protections may arise within the franchise 
relationship itself. 
The franchisor must assist—at least with information, if not more—
its franchisees insofar as they need help in finding financing.  This 
private network of franchisor counseling can be the basis for focusing 
the latest public law intervention on behalf of fringe lending debtors to 
those who are truly consumers, not small business owners.  As long as 
the franchisee has actively engaged the franchisor in its financing 
process, then the focus of limited regulatory resources can be on 
ordinary consumer loans, with the franchisee having other avenues to  
pursue fraud, breach of contract, or other claims with respect to                                                                                
financing gone awry. 
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